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Why be a mayor of a small city if you can be president of a 
country? Why be a lieutenant in someone else’s army if you can 
be a general in your own? 
C. King in ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War:  
Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognised States’  
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Abstract 
Most studies of unrecognised states have concentrated on understanding the nature of 
these ‘unreal’ states, how their presents in the international community changes our 
perception of sovereignty or why they exists in the first place. This study instead sets 
about to examine a rarer topic concerning unrecognised states, their foreign policy 
capabilities. Though unrecognised by most of the world, states such as the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic, a piece of de facto independent Armenian land inside Azerbaijan, 
certainly participate in international diplomacy. Having seven permanent representative 
offices – or embassies if you will – around the world, this study finds that in certain ways 
Nagorno-Karabakh is able to conduct foreign policy.  
Through an exploratory case study we are able to show that Nagorno-Karabakh is able 
to conduct a limited foreign policy, though identifying their most important policy aims 
and diplomatic relations. Most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s foreign policy is conducted 
through their patron state Armenia, a limited number of very secret diplomatic 
meetings, political lobbying on lower political levels in important states through there 
representative offices and – maybe the most notable – through PR diplomacy where 
public information supporting Nagorno-Karabakh’s aims  is spread through friendly 
minded organisations and the Armenian diaspora. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
In a little visited corner of Europe, landlocked inside Azerbaijan, we find the Armenian 
populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh. A region in which the citizens voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of a new constitution in 2006, declaring that “The Nagorno 
Karabagh Republic, Artsakh, is a sovereign, democratic state based on social justice and 
the rule of law” (NKR, 2006). Still recognised by no one as a sovereign state, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) actually seceded from Azerbaijan during a six-year 
violent conflict more than a decade earlier and initially declared their independence 
back in 1991 (de Waal, 2013:174).  
 
 
Unrecognised states such as NKR have begun to receive more profound attention from 
the world of International Relation scholars within the last decade or so (Lynch, 2004). 
This attention has largely concentrated itself around these entities’ sovereignty, how we 
can understand sovereignty in their light, and how to generally understand them. Less 
Territory of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
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focus have been on how these unrecognised states have been- and are able to 
intermingle in a world neatly divided into about 200 recognised states; which have 
created an international community that very much thinks in terms of the sovereign 
recognised state. Important exceptions are Lynch (2001 and 2004), King (2001), Hill 
(2003) and Owtram (2011). While Lynch and King’s main focus is on understanding 
unrecognised states, Hill’s is solely on foreign policy, with Owtram making the vital 
fusion between the logics of unrecognised states and Hill’s broader-than-normal 
definitions of Foreign Policy. 
Although Owtram has taken the initial steps on describing what aims, capabilities and 
key relations the unrecognised states engages in, his work does not cover how 
unrecognised states performs (and are allowed to perform) foreign policy in an 
international community that does not recognise the unrecognised state’s right to 
conduct any kind of policy. The aim of this project is hence to identify the foreign policy 
tools available to unrecognised states in continuation of Owtram’s theory and the more 
general understandings of unrecognised states. 
Given the time available to write this project, choosing to focus on a particular 
unrecognised state seems preferably as to try to understand the problematic about 
foreign policy across all the unrecognised states in existence. In this light the case of 
NKR is not arbitrarily chosen. While there are a number of recognised states1 
challenging the normal perception of a globe divided neatly into sovereign, recognised 
states, a few of these states are, like NKR, not recognised by anyone (Transnistria and 
Somaliland). Whereas others are recognised by a single recognised country (South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Northern Cyprus) with whom they have diplomatic relations. 
None of these states are members of the United Nations. But even members of the 
United Nations – such as Israel – does not enjoy full recognition by the rest of the 
world’s states. We will return to this notion of sovereign, recognised states at a later 
                                                        
1 Amongst not fully recognised states are Israel (not recognised by 32 UN states), the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), Kosovo, South Ossetia (in Georgia), Abkhazia (also in Georgia), the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, Transnistria (in Moldova) and Somaliland (in Somalia). The list however is not limited to these. 
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point in this report, for now we just mention these cases in order to specify the choice of 
NKR.  
Neither NKR nor Transnistria are recognised by any other state, and both are within our 
reach here in Europe. Still NKR is the unrecognised state with the least powerful patron 
state. A patron state is a larger, recognised state that supports a lesser unrecognised 
state politically, militarily or economically. While the rest of the unrecognised states in 
Europe are supported by large powers, either Russia (Transnistria, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia) or the United States (Kosovo) is NKR’s patron state Armenia. So among the 
unrecognised states in Europe, i.e. within our physical reach, NKR is the one that seems 
to have the most difficulties in conducting its foreign policies efficiently. Thus making 
NKR the most interesting of the unrecognised states to use as a case, due to the notion 
that it is somehow the ‘least’ recognised and supported of these states. 
 
Foreign Policy of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Given the fact that NKR has managed to build a decent state despite being unrecognised 
by the rest of the world, it has not gained the state any international recognition – the 
foremost aim of NKR foreign policy. None of NKR’s laws or institutions are valid outside 
their own borders, NKR citizens hold Armenian passports in order to be able to travel 
and Stepanakert2 Airport sits unused on the city’s outskirts because any flight to or from 
needs Azerbaijan’s approval according to international aviation laws. (Horizons, 2011; 
Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2008:500-1 & 2012a:144) Lastly no diplomats, except the odd 
peace negotiators, ever set foot in NKR: 
When NKR celebrated its fifteenth anniversary as a separate state on 2 September 2006, it 
was in the presence of, among others, visiting guests from the other three unrecognised 
states, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Few other state leaders, however, bothered 
to come. Recognised states and unrecognised states do not play together. (Blakkisrud & 
Kolstø, 2008:484) 
                                                        
2 The region’s capital city. 
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These few peace negotiators seem to have been enough for NKR to establish a foreign 
ministry, something that was done on July 23, 1993 to “represent official policies and 
defend the Republic's interests in the international arena.” (NKR USA, 2013) The foreign 
ministry of NKR have become an important part of NKR’s claim to statehood in terms of 
showing de facto administrative capabilities as a state. Since its establishment the 
foreign ministry have managed to open seven representative offices abroad. One office 
has opened in each of the three states that have been instrumental in the negotiations 
surrounding the conflict (USA, Russia & France), in countries with a large group of 
Armenian diaspora (Germany, Australia & Lebanon), as well as in Armenia. 
These two last pieces of information seems to contradict each other. When foreign 
diplomats and states do not recognise NKR, and barely set foot there – albeit to stop a 
war – would it not be in vain for NKR to engage so heavily in foreign policy, opening 
seven ‘embassies’ around the world?  
The purpose of this project is to examine the possibilities and difficulties for NKR to 
conduct foreign policy and with which means they are able to do this, given that they are 
not international recognised as a sovereign state. Thus leading us to the following 
research question: 
 
Research Question  
How is the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’s foreign policy affected by the state’s 
unrecognised status? 
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Working Questions 
In order to help answering the research question and because state secession and 
recognition are complex issues, we have constructed three working questions to guide 
us towards the final conclusion. 
These working questions will provide the theoretical and empirical context needed to 
examine and understand the complexities, not only of NKR foreign policy, but also its 
place in the world as an unrecognised state: 
 What is an unrecognised state and how can we understand NKR in the context of the 
dominant international system of sovereign states? 
 Which factors and key relations are important for NKR’s foreign policy aims? 
 To what extent is it possible for NKR to conduct a foreign policy? 
 
Thesis Structure 
Reaching this point, you have been through our general introduction to this thesis. 
Besides a short presentation of the subject we have also tried to justify the need for this 
kind of thesis, given the lack of literature on unrecognised state’s foreign policy. We have 
also shortly commented on the current conditions for NKR’s foreign policy before 
presenting our central research question and three guiding working question we have 
asked to help us keep the right focus.  
If you do decide to read any further, you will reach out methodology chapter. Kept short 
is the presentation to our approach and reasoning behind conducting an explorative 
case study, our empirical data – including reflections about the interview we conducted 
in Paris with the permanent representative to France from NKR – as well as out chosen 
theories. Once you have been through this we will jump right into our analysis, not 
wanting to bore our readers with the same information too many times, we have 
decided to present the parts of the empirical data and theories that is not already 
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familiarised for the reader as we go along – explaining challenges or reflections as we 
reach them.  
The analysis is threefold – one part answering one of our working questions. First we 
define unrecognised states as quasi-states and present their position and interaction in 
today’s world otherwise consisting of sovereign and recognised states. In the second 
part of the analysis we take a closer look on the central aims of unrecognised states 
foreign policies along with the key relations needed for quasi-states to pursue these 
aims. Thirdly we reach what it is all about: Foreign policy and how nonrecognition 
affects the conduction of foreign policy. 
However, before we tell you all about our results, and in order to give a better 
understanding of the conflict and the circumstances in which NKR was created, we begin 
with a short walk-through of the historical background of the current conflict. This 
should hopefully also create the basic insight as to why the NKR insists on being a 
separate, sovereign state as described in the short extract of their constitution. 
 
History of the Conflict 
While both Armenians and Azerbaijanis have put forward ancient claims to the region, 
the conflict is rather a result of the rise of Armenian and Azeri nationalism in the late 
19th century and should be dismissed as an ‘ancient conflict’. It is rather a conflict that 
both in form and content dates back little more than a hundred years. (de Waal cited in 
Lynch, 2004:35)  
The area presently known as Nagorno-Karabakh shifted hands several times between 
the Persian, Russian and Ottoman Empires before the beginning of the 19th century. It 
was not until the Russo-Persian wars in 1805, where Russia finally gained the upper 
hand and won control over the region – as well as the rest of Azerbaijan. While the parts 
that are now Armenia was not scooped up by the Russian Empire until 1926. (Lynch, 
2004:36) 
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In 1918, barely a hundred years later, in the post-revolution chaos and the wake of the 
First World War both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence. The new 
republics’ independence only lasted a few years and ended when the Red Army marched 
in during 1920 to occupy South-Caucasia and establish Soviet Rule. (Krüger, 2010:5-13) 
The Bolshevik leaders promised to unite Karabakh with the new Soviet Armenian Union 
Republic and on July 4, 1921 a resolution from the Caucasian Bureau in Moscow 
confirmed the transfer. However the decision was reversed the following day after 
protests from the leader of Soviet Azerbaijan, Nariman Narimanov, and the Karabakh 
region experienced less than 24 hours of unification with Armenia. Instead the 
Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh was created within the Azerbaijan Union 
Republic in July 1923 subordinate that some 94 percent of the population was 
Armenian. Consequently many Armenians today see the Soviet Rule to have led the 
foundation for the current conflict, and even though Nagorno-Karabakh’s tie to 
Azerbaijan became stronger during those years under Soviet rule, by 1989 only around 
40,000 of the 188,000 inhabitants of the region were Azerbaijani. (Lynch, 2004:36) 
This was not without any ethnic tensions. As early as August 1987, Armenians were 
calling for a return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia with tens of thousands signing 
petitions for that purpose. The first violence occurred in October the same year, and the 
first deaths due riots followed in the Karabakhian town of Askeran in February 1988. 
Moscow refused to grant the transfer, instead trying to calm the situation by promising 
more investments in the region, but by then it was too late. A Karabakh Committee was 
set up in Armenia to spearhead an upsurge of nationalism and though this was mostly 
directed towards Moscow it could not avoid affecting the situation in Azerbaijan. One 
effect was blind popular violence and blood spilled during a two-day riot in the 
Azerbaijani city of Sumgait, which also marks the beginning of the massive movement of 
Armenians out of Azerbaijan and vice versa. (Lynch, 2004:37) 
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Post-Soviet 
During the days of Soviet collapse it was a poorly kept secret that Armenia would not be 
able to lay claim to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh without international 
opprobrium, thus Yerevan side-stepped this problem by declaring the area independent. 
This was basically a move that allowed Armenia to distance itself as a party in the 
conflict, and instead enabling them to act as nothing more than an interested observer. 
On 2 September 1991 – three days after Azerbaijan had declared independence – the 
regional parliament in Stepanakert declared independence of the new Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic (NKR). The leaders in Stepanakert assessed that by Soviet law, 
autonomous regions had the right to secede from newly independent states. Not 
surprisingly the authorities in Baku responded by rescinded Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
autonomy on November 21, to which NKR countered by organising a referendum, 
boycotted by the Azeri minority, where 108,615 people voted in favour of independence. 
Just 24 people voted against. War was never officially declared, but the constant 
escalation of violence and left-behind Soviet weaponry due to the Union’s collapse, 
turned the conflict into a full-blown war with the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh Defence 
Army (NKDA), supported by Armenia, on one side versus Azerbaijan on the other. 
(Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2008:487; de Waal, 2013:174)  
Multiple efforts of meditating a settlement by first Russia, then Kazakhstan led nowhere. 
During the late 1992 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
created the so-called Minsk Group, including amongst others Russia, France and the 
United States, to lead the negotiations. Inexperience with this particular type of conflict 
combined with differing interest within the group made the opening work unfruitful. 
When the Russian envoy started shuttle-diplomacy on the side of the Minsk Group it 
initially resulted in a new offensive from Azerbaijan, who thought Russia biased towards 
Armenia, but in May 1994 the parties manage to agree on a ceasefire that has ‘genially 
held to date’. (Mooradian & Druckman, 1999:710-11) 
When the ceasefire was finally brokered, the conflict had left at least 25,000 dead and 
forced more than 700,000 refugees to relocate (Lynch, 2004:35-7). Furthermore, NKDA 
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occupied approximately 15 % of the Azerbaijani territory. This included most of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as seven districts outside it, while the Azeri troops 
held on to just a few areas in the north and east. This occupation meant that the ethnic 
Azeri population fled the region in large numbers, while Armenians from the rest of 
Azerbaijan poured in. (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2012a:141) The separatist NKDA, and 
Armenia, had at the end of the conflict thus won most of what in Soviet times had been 
the autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
After the separatist war, the constellation consisting of the NKDA’s political leadership 
and Armenia argued for the region’s right to self-determination. Azerbaijan on the other 
side however kept insisting on their territorial integrity over the region, arguing that the 
violent secession attempt was illegitimate and an infringement of international law, 
since Azerbaijan would not accept the secession. These two positions have been held 
during the last two decades and largely made further negotiations intractable, leaving 
the region in a state of ‘no war, no peace’. 
 
 
Territory controlled by the new Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (in light gray). 
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Establishing a Nagorno-Karabakh Republic 
With the cease-fire agreement in place the ruling elite, consisting of former Soviet 
bureaucrats and war heroes could begin to establish their powerbase and leadership 
over the now de facto independent NKR. The elected leader of NKR became Robert 
Kocharian, former member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The most powerful 
man however was Samvel Babayan, an all-Armenian hero from the war, who managed to 
position himself on the combined positions of defence minister and commander of the 
armed forces. (de Waal, 2013: 253-5) 
Building a new state; creation of military -, economic- and administrative capacities, in a 
new independently NKR must have been helped greatly by the state-infrastructure 
inherited by the old oblast’s status autonomous as in the former Soviet Republic of 
Azerbaijan. With a standing army of 18,000 to 25,000 men NKR have the largest army of 
any of the unrecognised states (Blandy, 2008:14). Further have the occupation of 
Azerbaijani territory shortened the front line considerably making the small state a lot 
more defendable. In terms of military capacities are NKR doing well, not to speak of their 
alliance with Armenia. NKR’s military capacities have become so great that it has the 
potential to turn into a double-edged sword. As mentioned it was not NKR’s first 
president, Robert Kocharian that was considered the most powerful politician in the 
new civilian government, but the defence minister and army commander, Babayan. 
When Kocharian departed for Yerevan in 1997 as newly elected Prime Minister, Babyan 
gained even more power. Only disagreements with the rest of the leadership saw him 
sacked in late 1999 and he was accused for a failed assassination attempt on the new 
president Arkady Gukasian in March 2000 landing him 14 years in jail. (Blakkisrud & 
Kolstø, 2008:490-2; de Waal, 2013:252-3) 
Economically NKR was heavily affected by the war and the material damage was high. 
Other unrecognised states often become black spots or safe havens for shadow 
economies ran by smugglers and their likes. It was a problem during the first years of 
peace, but given that NKR is a dead end, with literally one road leading both in and out of 
the territory, it was largely bypassed by the smugglers between Iran and Russia. The 
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government has also been able to curb the initially high inflation rate, has achieved 
macro-economic stabilisation, and corruption is less of a problem in NKR than in the 
unrecognised states of Georgia, partly due to the fact that there are far less aid money 
being poured into NKR. Instead the large Armenian diaspora around the world have 
been in charge of subsidising the restoration efforts – especially focusing on the 
infrastructure. The local authorities have tried to attract foreign investments with a very 
low tax on profits and have succeeded with an early privatisation, price liberation and a 
general transition from the Soviet system to market economy. Most important however 
might be the huge interstate loans from Armenia, and while NKR officials denied that 
they are surviving on Armenia’s mercy, the loan did account for almost €60 million in 
2006. All this gives the authorities in Stepanakert a budget increase of roughly 12 
percent per year since 2000, with 44 percent of the total budget spent on the social 
sector. The official subsistence level is set at $49 a month and while activists estimate 
that 40 percent of the population lives for less than that, it is still rather impressive 
given that Azerbaijan is trying to isolate the area economically. (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 
2008:495-6) 
Some authors are very critical towards the democracies in unrecognised states. Lynch 
(2004:68) have characterised the political stability of all the separatist states of the 
Caucasus as ‘founded on corrupt corporatism’. Others have a less gloomy look on NKR’s 
democracy. Despite the criticism of being biased and skewed towards American-style 
governance, Freedom House gave NKR the ranking ‘partly free’ from 2001 to 2013,3 
while Azerbaijan was rated ‘not free’ (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2012a:142; Freedom House, 
2013:20). The development is certainly not all that encouraging, but: 
According to the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, ‘Karabakh today is an oasis of good 
governance, respect for law and decency by comparison with most of the rest of the post-
Soviet Union’ (quoted in Gardner, 2008, p. 549). This is clearly an exaggeration, but may 
nevertheless be a more accurate description than claims to the effect that Nagorno-Karabakh 
is a ‘failing state’ and a ‘racketeer state’. (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2012a:149) 
                                                        
3 In 2011 and 2012, NKR slipped one point on ‘political rights’ and was therefore for the first time 
categorised as ‘not free’. In 2013 NKR regain this one point and its ‘partly free’ assessment. 
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The positive assessments are due to its small size and exceptional homogeneity that has 
facilitated democratic development, as has the fact that NKR’s leaders have seen 
democratisation as a way to improve the chances of international recognition. Further is 
the argument used by NKR that a ‘democratic’ NKR should not be submersed into 
‘authoritarian’ Azerbaijan. The new constitution drafted in 2006, also inched NKR closer 
to more democratic values, as did the breakout from the association with the other 
South Caucasus separatist states, both because they saw themselves as more democratic, 
and believed that distancing themselves from the other states would increase their 
international image and reputation (Blakkisrud & Kolstrø, 2008:485; Gardner, 2011:98).  
The main concerns are the fact that NKR have yet to facilitate a transition of power from 
the current elite to the (almost non-existing) opposition. This can be a matter of freedom 
or simply due to NKR’s unrecognised status, where the looming Azeri invasion creates 
an external threat that limits the political field and buries political disagreements to 
maintain stability (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2012a:149-50). Genuine participation of an 
opposition in the July 2013 presidential election (Freedom House, 2013:20), as well as 
general official attitude towards recognition of NKR as an independent state4 
(Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2008:502) supports this latter hypothesis. 
Thus reaching this the current situation in NKR, we are able to leave the history behind 
and continue this thesis with our approach on how to answer the research question. 
  
 
 
  
                                                        
4 Only one small party, Mer Tun’ Hayastan, meaning ‘Armenia Our Home,’ argues openly for unification 
with Armenia. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
This project sets out to study NKR’s possibilities and challenges in conducting a coherent 
foreign policy despite their status in the international community as an unrecognised 
state. Answering the thesis’ research question through our working question, we have 
approached the field with a case study method. The approach is qualitative and will be 
based on empirical data collected either by us or authors with extensive knowledge 
about Nagorno-Karabakh or the Caucasus region.  
The case study cannot be an explanatory study of causal relationships due to the fact 
that NKR’s nonrecognition limits their manoeuvrability on the international stage of 
politics (Gevorgian, 2013:74) and this makes it difficult to determine the relationship 
between foreign policies’ initiatives and effects. Instead we are conducting what Yin calls 
an explanatory case study. (Yin, 2003:4) 
Using the qualitative approach to the study of how the unrecognition affects the foreign 
policy of NKR gives us the opportunity to get an in-depth understanding of a process of 
great complexity. Unrecognised states – as is the case with other states – conduct their 
foreign policy differently dependent on the state’s size, power, geographical location, 
neighbours and the given context (Donnelly, 2006), thus using the qualitative approach 
gives us an opportunity to navigate through the complexity of nonrecognised foreign 
policy. Concentrating our case study singlehandedly on NKR, instead of embarking on a 
project where each unrecognised state’s foreign policy is examined, was simply a matter 
of the time available. Having been able to conclude anything on the issue of 
unrecognised state’s foreign policy in general would have been appealing, but the 
amount of data, contexts and historical backgrounds needed would have been immense 
for a project this size. Therefore we will concentrate our efforts using NKR’s foreign 
policy as a case, thereby giving us the opportunity to evaluate the foreign policy of a 
single unrecognised state.  
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Why a Case Study? 
The research question posed in this project is aimed at exploring different processes and 
characteristics of NKR foreign policy, based on the fact that NKR is unrecognised and 
that this will affect the foreign policy. Case study research is well suited to discover 
nuances of a phenomenon and is often used to delve into complexities (Bryman, 
2008:53). Case study research does not distinguish between different types of data 
collection methods, so different kinds of qualitative and quantitative methods can be 
utilized to shed light on NKR’s foreign policy (Yin, 2003:64), thus keeping our options 
open. Due to the limited previous research and the available data on the topic, the case 
study approach also suits this project.  
The case study allows for exploration research of different aspects of NKR’s foreign 
policy and takes contextual factors into account. While the exploratory case study do 
have a notorious reputation as intuitive and perceived as sloppy, the does give the 
researchers a possibility to discover theory and work with phenomenon’s in their ‘raw’ 
form. Although the form is often used to generate new research questions it can also be 
used to create hypothesises, which will be this thesis’ aim. (Yin, 1993:5)  
 
Empirical Data 
The empirical data used in this project is by far and large qualitative. We will by relying 
on official documentation, our own interview with NKR’s Permanent Representative in 
Paris, as well as other interviews and research about NKR done by others, to analyse and 
hypothesise about the foreign policy potential and challenges of an unrecognised state. 
Mostly the data is based on interviews, either conducted by us or by Thomas de Waal 
(de Waal, 2006). Other second hand sources for our empirical data are journals, typical 
concerning Eurasia-, Caucasus- or Peace Studies, while the different homepages of the 
Armenian and NKR authorities have also been used. For the purpose of data collection 
the secondary documentary material has been central for this study.  
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One of our main sources is de Waal’s book Black Garden. The book is grounded on de 
Waal’s descriptive research of the conflict surrounding NKR where he has conducted 
around 120 interviews with presidents, public officials, diplomats, former soldiers, 
expats, and the odd car dealer. Thomas de Waal supplements this with eyewitness 
reports and a number of other secondary sources (de Waal, 2013:ix). The book focuses 
mostly on the conflict, but since the 2nd edition was released this summer, and updated 
with the last ten year’s stalemate and status quo, plenty of information about NKR’s 
foreign policy, dealings with Armenia and Russia, the importance of the diaspora and 
general information on the nonrecognition have been included.  
 
The Interview 
However, relying on documents, statements and interviews done by a secondary person 
for another purpose than ours is not always satisfactory, although the collected data 
offer quite transparent information. To supplement this with targeted information on 
NKR’s foreign policy, its day-to-day execution and NKR’s own considerations about 
foreign policy, we decided to do an interview with a diplomat from the NKR’s foreign 
policy service. We had a few different possibilities to choose from as NKR have 
permanent representations in Berlin, Paris and Yerevan, all within travelling distance. 
However getting from Yerevan to NKR takes most of a day each way, and time wise it 
would be a bad decision to travel all that way just to spend the majority of our time 
there on traveling back and forth. We chose the Permanent Representative Office – the 
closest an unrecognised state gets to an embassy – in Paris, because France is co-chair of 
the Minsk Group. With France’s position as a co-chair we presumed that the diplomat 
had a better insight in the negotiations that are being conducted in and through the 
Minsk Group about the region, and how NKR can interact with not only the French co-
chair, but also with the Minsk Group as a whole. Further does France have a much larger 
amount of Armenian Diaspora than Germany does (Diaspora, 2013), adding to the 
relevance of that dimension of NKR’s foreign policy. 
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A concern during an interview with diplomats is that they can have a restricted mandate 
to comment on official policy or that they will often act with great loyalty towards their 
home country – shining a too positive light on government actions and policies. 
Therefore we went into this interview with the knowledge that it probably would not 
produce a large amount of critical opinions on NKR’s foreign policy, neither on the 
conduction of it nor its priorities.  
The interview was semi-structured with Hovhannes Gevorgian, the representative or 
the non-ambassador if you will, and lasted for about an hour, allowing for new ideas and 
questions to be brought up during the interview.  Mr Gevorgian was asked a set of 
questions about both NKR’s foreign policy, NKR as unrecognised in in the international 
system, and about the office’s possibilities to conduct foreign policy. He is the office’s 
highest ranking official and was able to speak both on his own behalf and on behalf of 
the office. Consequently, it was difficult to distinguish between personal convictions and 
official NKR policies in a few of the answers. Although this does not change the fact that 
Mr Gevorgian is one of the highest ranking officials outside Armenia and NKR and one 
we actually had access to. 
As the most widely used method in qualitative research, the interview is accompanied 
by some important questions about, how to prepare the interview, how to avoid leading 
questions, how to analyse the answers, etc. (Bryman, 2008:436) In addition, considering 
that the informant was what Kvale (2009:167) would call “an elite-interviewee with an 
excessive knowledge about the topic”, measures to avoid the informant’s adapting the 
interview to his own agenda had to be considered. Gaining enough information before 
preparing the questions goes a long way in accommodating these considerations: Having 
a pre-written question schema, asking open-ended questions and having thought of a 
couple of follow-up questions to the most likely answers beforehand, is all part of the 
necessary preparations. Much can hence be done to facilitate a good interview. The aim 
of the data collection was to gather information on several particular topics. Moreover, 
post-interview answers should be divided into sub-groups according to their value and 
relevance for the different parts of the analysis. And of course should any given 
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information gained from a single interview not be left alone as a reliable conclusion, but 
being backed up by some other source or peace of data.  
Lastly it was a big challenge conducting the interview because the interviewee, Mr 
Gevorgian did not speak English. Therefore we had to use a translator, something that 
should not be taken lightly: 
You should be careful choosing a translator, who is culturally acceptable, as well as skilled in 
the language. The translator’s role is to assist and not to take over the role of the interviewer 
or the interviewee.  This can especially be a risk, if you instead of using a professional 
translator, use a relative or a friend as the translator. (Kvale, 2009: pp. 164-165) 
We had to use an acquaintance as translator; someone who, though a native speaker of 
both French and English, is not a professional translator. In an effort to prepare this 
makeshift translator, we had provided him with our interview guide, as well as some 
background informations a few days ahead of the interview as preparation, and we 
recorded the entire interview as well. The latter precaution in order to get it translated 
once more after we returned to Denmark, to make sure we did not miss anything. In that 
way our translator can be considered an essential part of asking the questions, but not 
an essential part for understanding the answers later on. Though this obviously made it 
more difficult to ask precise and relevant follow-up questions, but it made the interview 
possible in the first place. 
 
Choices of theory 
The theoretical foundation for this project will be presented along with the analysis, 
when it fits in; therefore it has not yet been presented in full, although this should not 
excuse us from justifying why we use said theories in the first place.  
It has been necessary to begin our analysis with a sematic reassessment since there is 
not any uniformly terminology for unrecognised states. To this have we used Pål 
Kolstø’s article The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States (2006), in 
which he – to further confusion some might argue – define unrecognised states as ‘quasi-
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states’ despite Jackson’s (1993) original use of the term. It does however fit nicely with 
our own discontent about the rest of the commonly used terms for unrecognised 
political entities. And in a more pragmatic line of reasoning does it give us a welcoming 
excuse to include some of the course literature that is mandatory for this project. 
Kolstø’s article does not limit itself to terminological discussions; it also presents a range 
of surveys and theories on subjects such as quasi-states’ sovereignty, sustainability 
factors, undermining conditions and typical ends. Much of it is very useful throughout 
the process of understanding quasi-states as outlined below. 
We have already spent quite some words on describing the historical background of the 
conflict, something we deemed necessary given the rather limited attention it has gotten 
through the years. We are also using a rather large part of our analysis on understanding 
quasi-states’ place in the world, as we consider the thorough understanding of these 
political entities vital in order to analyse their foreign policy. To this we use the newest 
theories we have been able to find, which are Caspersen & Stansfield (2011) and 
Caspersen (2012). Literature on unrecognised states is in general rather limited, but 
established (Ker-Lindsay, 2012:3 & Kolstø, 2006:727). By limited, but established, is 
meant that the field is relatively new, but that a handful of authors have already 
established themselves as beacons in the field, as an example does basically every 
textbook or article on unrecognised states post-2006 refer to Kolstø’s article mentioned 
above. In this limited range of literature is Caspersen’s book Unrecognized States (2012) 
the most comprehensive piece of literature providing a holistic understanding of 
unrecognised states we have come across. It includes among other important points a 
five-point definition of what constitutes a quasi-state, while Unrecognized States in the 
International System (Caspersen & Stansfield, 2011) has a number of essays covering 
very specific themes that link the emergence, operations, and development of 
unrecognised states to a better understanding of the phenomenon of such states.  
Throughout the studying of quasi-states we also had to touch upon the general 
discussion of sovereignty in order to figure out how unrecognised states are affected by 
this. Shortly presented is Krasner’s (1999) division of sovereignty into four different 
aspects. This is again course literature, but useful to show how far the actual nature of 
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sovereignty is from the idea that sovereignty is one specific concept. Instead we use 
Caspersen’s (2012) approach to sovereignty where Krasner’s four aspects (two internal 
and two external) have been limited to one internal and one external, statehood and 
recognition respectively, to suit the reality of quasi-states. 
A few other authors have been used when they could contribute, Lynch (2002 & 2004), 
who wrote on Eurasia’s separatist states in the beginning of the previous decade. Lynch 
has been used to describe the creation of quasi-states and a few of the authors inside 
Caspersen & Stansfield’s collection of essays have been references in their own right 
when we have used them. Finally, it should be noted that articles of Blakkisrud & Kolstø 
(2008 & 2012) are more descriptive than theoretical and therefore used as empirical 
date, contrary to the article Kolstø (2006) wrote singlehandedly.  
After this long range of theories used to describe quasi-states like NKR, we can continue 
to the theories used in our analysis of quasi-states foreign policy. Two authors have been 
significant, Hill’s (2003) and Owtram (2011), the former for the definition of foreign 
policy and the latter being one of the only texts examining foreign policy of quasi-states, 
at least by the author’s own account (Owtram, 2011:128). Hill is used because his 
definition of foreign policy is broader than most other definitions, giving way to the 
possibility that other political entities than classical recognised and sovereign states can 
conduct foreign policy – mentioning unrecognised states explicitly. Finally, we have used 
Owtram because he describes the factors, aims and key relations unrecognised states 
need to conducts foreign policy. These two theories will help us answer the question of 
how and to what extent nonrecognition affects the conducting foreign policy. 
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Chapter 3: Understanding Quasi-States 
In order to understand how unrecognised states, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic play the game of international politics we need to clear up not only what kind 
of unrecognised state we are dealing with, but also how such states differ from ‘normal’ 
recognised states. This chapter will – based on existing theory within the field – define 
unrecognised states such as NKR as quasi-states, and then the chapter will focus on how 
we can understand quasi-states in terms of statehood and recognition, the external and 
internal factors of sovereignty. Hereafter will we look at how these quasi-states usually 
spring into existence, before ending this theoretical walk-through with a note on how 
quasi-states survive in an international system that does not recognise their existence. 
 
Defining the Quasi-State 
The difficulties in identifying an accurate definition for unrecognised state-like political 
entities like NKR are rather extensive. Just giving the phenomenon a name have been a 
challenge for the authors writing about it. Within academia various names have been 
used: ‘de facto states’, ‘unrecognised states’, ‘pseudo-states’ and ‘quasi-states’ to name 
the most used (see Pegg, 1998; Lynch, 2002; King, 2001; Kolossov & O'Loughlin, 1999 – 
based on Kolstø, 2006).  
Kolstø (2006:725) uses the term quasi-states for these unrecognised states, but for 
many other scholars the term ‘quasi-states’ is synonymous with Robert H. Jacksons 
(1990) classical work Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World. Here does the terminology refer to established states, typically in Africa, that are 
kept from total collapse by the artificial recognition of other states and international 
organisations while they internally have descended into chaos. Think of states like the 
Congo or Somalia. However, as Kolstø argues, “in journalism and political jargon other 
terms are used to describe the same or virtually the same phenomena as what Jackson 
referred to as quasi-states. Most commonly used is 'failed states'…” (Kolstø, 2006:725) 
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Kolstø’s point is here that Jackson’s term ‘quasi-states’ is no longer suitable to describe 
these kind of states because the term ‘failed states’ have gained ground in public 
languish. Instead Kolstø adopts Jackson’s term quasi-states because the unrecognised 
entities that he describes – like failed states – are located on the margins of the 
international political system, and because these kinds of states often rebel from 
failed/failing states and/or end up themselves as failed political entities or as new failed 
states – the Jacksonian variety of quasi-states – should they be granted recognition.  
We will therefore be diverging from Jackson’s definition of the quasi-state throughout 
this thesis in favour of adopting Kolstø’s terminology. Given that ‘quasi’ is “used to show 
that something is almost, but not completely, the thing described”5 the term ‘quasi-state’ 
seems to describe a political entity that is almost a state. In our case ‘almost’ covers the 
lack of recognition by the outside world. As for the three other terms used in the 
literature we disregard them for a variety of reasons. ‘Unrecognised states’ lacks 
precision and could be anything from totally unrecognised states like NKR, which is not 
recognised by a single state, to partially unrecognised states like Israel that only lacks 
recognition from thirty-two of the recognised states on the globe. While ‘pseudo’ means 
“pretended and not real” this would disregard and mark the fact that real people and real 
institutions of statehood actually exist on the ground in NKR. Lastly ‘de facto’ – probably 
the most used term for this kind of unrecognised state – has the definition “existing in 
fact, although perhaps not intended, legal, or accepted” as oppose to ‘de jure’ “having a 
right or existence as stated by law”. As we do not want to participate in the discussion on 
whether or not NKR, or other entities like it, existence is rightly we prefer to avoid the 
term ‘de facto’ as it stands in opposition to ‘de jure’. 
In order to further specify the definition of the political entity we refer to as a quasi-
state we have adopted Nina Caspersen’s (2012:11) five specific criteria for her work 
with unrecognised state. While her terminology, like Jackson’s, differ from the one of 
Kolstø and our own the definition does not. 
                                                        
5 All definitions are from the British English version of Cambridge Dictionaries Online. 
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The Caspersen criteria and NKR’s fulfilment of these are as follows:  
 A quasi-state has achieved de facto independence, covering at least two-
thirds of the territory which it lays claim to and include its main city and 
key territories.  
- Given that NKR have conquered considerable land from Azerbaijan doing 
the separatist war and holds almost all of the former Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast including the capital Stepanakert, (de Waal, 2013) 
NKR lives up to this criterion.  
 The leadership seek to build or expand state institutions further and 
demonstrate its own legitimacy.  
- Having created a parliament, presidency, a foreign ministry with seven 
permanent representation offices on four continents, holding regular 
elections and facilitating a standing army (NKR, 2013), NKR is definitely 
trying to show the world that they are a legit state.  
 The entity must have declared formal independence or demonstrated clear 
aspirations for independence.  
- NKR not only declared its independence during the secession war, in 
2006 a new constitution stating that NKR is a sovereign state was 
approved by a referendum. (de Waal, 2013:174 & NKR, 2006) 
 The entity has not gained international recognition from more than its 
patron state and a few other states of no great importance.  
- Not even Armenia, NKR’s patron state, has recognised NKR which then 
also lives up to this criterion. 
 And lastly must it have existed for more than two years.   
- NKR has existed as an unrecognised political entity since the ceasefire 
with Azerbaijan in 1994.  
Defining the quasi-state will not only help us understand our own terminology. It also 
helps us understand the concept of unrecognised states and how to view them in the 
light of recognised states. Thus we can continue building our understanding of these 
entities by taking a closer look at their place in the world. 
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The Dynamics of Quasi-States 
Acting – or trying to act – in the international system of sovereign states it is necessarily 
to understand, not only how the rest of the world sees the quasi-states, but also how the 
quasi-states cope with and approach the outside world’s assessment of them. 
Understanding the quasi-state in terms of sovereignty and statehood and how such a 
state differs from a normal (i.e. recognised) state gives an useful insight once we begin to 
understand how the quasi-states itself deals with the world’s attitude towards it. 
Traditionally sovereignty has been seen as a fairly straightforward way in international 
relations: “just as we know a camel or a chair when we see one, so we know a sovereign 
state.” (J. D. B. Miller, cited in Caspersen, 2012:13) Having the five-point definition above 
in mind the picture suddenly gets a little more blurry. For how do we know what a 
quasi-state, such as NKR, is when we look at it? De facto independent for a number of 
years, but not recognised by the rest of the world regardless that it is building and 
expanding its state institutes to their best ability. Sovereignty as a single factor has lately 
been questioned by a number of scholars. The most thorough has probably been Krasner 
(1999, 2001 & 2009) who divides sovereignty into domestic, interdependence, 
international legal and Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to the 
organisation of public authority within a state and the level of exercising control 
efficiently. Interdependence sovereignty is the ability of public authorities to control 
trans-border movements. International legal sovereignty can be translated into 
international recognition by other states and international organisations, while 
Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusion of external actors from domestic 
arrangements. (Krasner, 1999:9) 
While these four distinctions of sovereignty is very useful for analysing sovereignty in 
general a less complex approach to sovereignty might be desirable in order to 
understand the particular dynamics effecting the quasi-state. Instead we can narrow 
these four aspects down to two, where the two former can be categorised as internal 
factors of sovereignty and the latter two can be categorised as external factors for 
sovereignty. This internal and external sovereignty recurs in Caspersen’s (2012:103-
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122) analysis of unrecognised states’ statehood and nonrecognition. Here ‘statehood’ 
equals internal sovereignty, and international recognition equals external sovereignty. 
As it is not the easiest explanation to follow, here is an example: “… Two conclusions can 
be drawn from this. First, that degree of statehood, internal sovereignty, should be seen as 
a variable. … Second, it alerts us to the fact that external sovereignty is not decisive for 
internal order.” (Caspersen, 2012:104) The point is that the connection between internal 
and external sovereignty is not necessarily a strong one – or existing at all. This is 
especially not the case for quasi-states like NKR. Successful state-building and later 
statehood is not all that dependent on international recognition. The internal authorities 
of a given quasi-state might be in ruins much to the likeliness of a classical failed stated 
(think of the Jacksonian state here) or it might be relatively stable and functional. 
Taiwan is probably the best example for the latter. It does not matter whether or not 
NKR is recognised by the international community for the quasi-state to build 
functioning institutions, as described in the introduction, where taxes are set, a military 
controlled and presidents elected. Not being recognised does make it more difficult to 
build statehood, but it does not make it impossible, as Caspersen points out. 
International recognition limits external intervention, provides access to international 
resources and opens up possibilities for bi- and multilateral agreements with other 
states. (Caspersen, 2012:104-5) We return to these points in question once we have 
taken a closer look at NKR’s foreign policy options as a quasi-state.   
So while Caspersen determines that statehood is possible without international 
recognition, statehood is also a step towards the quasi-state’s goal of exactly that; 
gaining international recognition. Statehood helps quasi-states in two very distinct 
ways. Firstly building a strong state helps the entity’s international image, secondly it 
makes them better able to defend themselves from external enemies. This does not 
mean that quasi-states have the same conditions as recognised states for building their 
statehood. As we have just mentioned a lot of international cooperation cannot be 
conducted, international insurance branches will not insure foreign investors’ 
investments inside the quasi-states and costs of living might rise due to the fact that 
goods cannot be imported by legal means. However, succeeding in building a rather 
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well-functioning state, can change the quasi-states’ focus – at least in the short term – 
from gaining international recognition to maintaining status quo. Simply because the 
quasi-states’ leaders is thus ensured their independence from their parent state,6 
something the might have to compromise with in an ensuring settlement. It should be 
said that this is a dangerously long term strategy because nonrecognition does not 
promise the aspect of international cooperation, security from the parent state and 
economic prosperity. And though status quo might be enough for the elites controlling 
the quasi-state it rarely is it for the population, which support is an essential foundation 
under the statehood that has been build. (Caspersen, 2012:106-7 & 113-6) 
All this theoretical background on how the quasi-states functions, internally and 
externally will be useful to keep in the back of our minds as we continue to take a closer 
look at the establishing and sustainability of quasi-states. 
 
Creating and Sustaining Quasi-states 
Having terminology, definition and their sovereignty-status vis-à-vis recognised and 
established states in place we can continue to how these quasi-states get established in 
the international landscape in the first place and how they survive there. Contemporary 
unrecognised states differ from their historical counterparts. Before the First World War 
sovereignty came from within qua a state’s – or a ruler’s – ability to exercise supremacy. 
Guidelines for interstate recognition became part of international law during the inter-
war period, through the Montevideo Convention and the Stimson Doctrine. However the 
creation states and nonrecognition during those years had more to do with ideology and 
strategic interests than anything else. The Japanese attempt to establish the Manchukuo 
state (1932-45) in northern China, or Nazi Germany’s puppet government in the First 
Slovak Republic (1939-45), which were not recognised by any of the states allied against 
Imperial Japan and Nazi-Germany are notable examples of this kind of states and 
                                                        
6 Parent state is understood as the state from witch secessionist movements or quasi-states are trying to 
secede from. 
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nonrecognition. Recognition was very much politicised and depended upon whether the 
(puppet) state was established by an ally or not (Caspersen, 2012:26-9). These states 
differ indeed from the contemporary quasi-states of the post-Soviet era since they had 
been established with an external leadership. 
The legality of a state’s creation increased in importance after World War II and the 
nature of a state’s regime and/or its use of force became equally important. The 
nonrecognition of Rhodesia, of South Africa’s refusal to surrender control of Namibia, or 
the Soviet Union annexing of the Baltic States is just some examples of how ideology or 
international norms have replaced a state’s empirical capabilities (supremacy) as 
reasons for lack of recognition. This form for ideological nonrecognition has largely 
(USA have yet to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea) been replaced by the 
principles of territorial integrity and self-determination as established during the 
decolonisation of the 20th century. Most quasi-states, including NKR, makes the claim of 
national self-determination, a now very restrictive right since the quasi-states cannot 
claim to be subjects of colonisation. Hence most secessionist conflicts are typically 
viewed as domestic conflicts within the parent state in the eyes of the international 
community, meaning that the quasi-states will not gain international recognition 
without the blessing of their parent state – even if they gain de facto independence 
through a secessionist war or the like. (Caspersen, 2012:29-31)  
“The objective is to exit the metropolitan [parent] state” (Lynch, 2004:14) is the very clear 
statement from Dov Lynch, who focuses on the linkage between ethnicity and territory. 
Lynch sees the quasi-states as a result of separatist movements for whom “nothing less 
than sovereignty will suffice for their authorities” (Lynch, 2004:14), something that was 
clearly stated during our interview with NKR’s permanent representative in Paris 
(Gevorgian, 2013:74). Caspersen argues in following lines: “Most of these entities 
[unrecognised states] emerge out of secessionist warfare. In most cases ethno-nationalism 
provided an important driving force, state breakdown was often an important factor, and 
external assistance was crucial” (Caspersen, 2012:26).  
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According to Hervey & Stansfield (2011:16-18) it is a common conception of quasi-
states that they are a result of separatist movements or -conflicts. In this traditional view 
secession is seen as the objective for national movements looking for an alternative to 
continue existence within the patron state, combined with political elites riding the 
wave of nationalism in order to enhance their own political purposes. The two authors 
argue that succession to a higher degree is a matter of the system of sovereign states 
that fails.  
The Wars of Soviet succession … are all examples of conflicts which, in the 1990s, resulted in 
the creation of de facto independent territories. It is arguably the case that state weakness 
and instability in the parent unions and sovereign arrangements both paved the way for 
conflict and provided the necessary openings for secessionist movements to secure territory 
and engage in processes of separation. (Hervey & Stansfield, 2011:19) 
The point is that secessionist movements rarely are able to make the first move 
themselves, but need some kind of state failure to gain the momentum needed to create 
the quasi-state. Following this argument NKR needed the Soviet Collapse to secede from 
Azerbaijan. Something that is supported in de Waal’s (2013:ch. one) description of the 
events. The conflict in NKR began during the crumbling years of the Soviet Union when 
it was too weak and indecisive to control their Caucasus republics, and full flung war 
began as the union disintegrated into smaller nation-states.  
Beside wars of secession the Caspersen quote above identifies three typical conditions 
that must be present on their path of creation: State breakdown, ethno-nationalistic 
ideologies and international actions or inactions. (Caspersen, 2012:32) The first 
condition stating that a state breakdown is needed fits well with Hervey & Stansfield’s 
arguments, as well as with de Waal’s description of the events. The NKR conflict also fits 
the second condition of ethno-nationalism since the conflict was initiated by Armenian 
nationalism in favour of merging the Armenian dominated Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast 
with the rest of Armenia – something that in turn created the uprising of nationalism in 
Azerbaijan fuelling the conflict in its early days. Lastly it was the Soviet inability to quell 
the early conflict, the union’s breakdown and the Armenian decision to join the NKDA 
actions that secured a successful secession war. Neither have the international 
community intervened notably in the current state of ‘no peace, no war’ – there is no 
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international peacekeepers on the ground, no sanctions towards neither Armenia nor 
Azerbaijan in an effort to force a solution and no pressure from the UN Security Council. 
Inaction is keeping NKR alive by not changing status quo.  
In continuation of the right settings for a secessionist agenda to evolve into a 
secessionist attempt, there are some conditions needed for a quasi-state to survive 
through the initial conflict. Chorev identifies these reasons for ‘prolonged status quo’ as 
“notable military achievements of the separatist state, ceasefire terms favourable to them, 
and a shared reluctance by both sides to reach compromise on the status issue.” (Chorev, 
2011:34) This is not only a matter of establishment, but also of sustainability. Kolstø 
have identified five factors contributing to the viability of unrecognised quasi-states: 
symbolic nation-building; a militarised society; support from a patron state; the weak 
parent state; and lack of efficient involvement from the international community 
(2006:729) 
Nation-building differs from state-building in certain aspects, but having reached a 
certain level of authority and institutions through state-building is often a precondition 
for successful nation-building. While state-building refers to some of the ‘hard’ factors 
discussed in our introduction such as establishing democratic or state institutions and 
organisations; creating an economy; and organising the military foundation of a 
functional state. Nation-building on the other hand focuses on the softer parts of state 
consolidation. This is typically initiatives such as developing a national identity through 
propaganda, state symbols, history writing, and the ‘invention’ of national traditions. 
This is often helped by memories of civil- or secessionist warfare, a common external 
enemy and a homogeneously population reached though ethnic-cleansing and mass 
exodus of ‘others’ out of the claimed territory and ‘ours’ into it. (Kolstø, 2006:730)  
For the NKR leaders this has been a fairly easy task. The war still figurate in the 
memories of most adults, many of whom fled from other parts of Azerbaijan, and the 
museums, monuments and veteran groups still play an important role during a number 
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of memorial days, as do large military parades.7 The common history of the war and the 
losses is thus kept very much alive. So is the threat to NKR’s existence from Azerbaijan 
and stories of human tragedy during Azeri hostilities towards Armenians are used as 
examples to show how fragile NKR’s existence is (Gevorgian, 2013:75). Armenian 
leaders, both in Armenia and NKR, also create a narrative of victory and survival in their 
public addresses strengthening the nation-building (de Waal, 2013:312). The 
homogeneously composition of NKR’s population is also shown clearly in the numbers 
of internal displaced people after the war; more than 700.000 people moved in and out 
of the territory NKR occupied. These were mostly Azeris who left, but Armenians also 
arrived from other parts of Azerbaijan, and have in this way created an all-Armenian 
NKR.  As any other nation-state NKR has created national symbols such as a coat of 
arms, a national anthem, their own flag and an array of national holidays, including 
Independence Day (NKR USA, 2013).  
The militarised society Kolstø points to as necessary is very much present in NKR – 
maybe to a larger degree than in any other quasi-state. With a standing army of 18,000-
25,000 persons and with another 20,000 to 30,000 in the reserve, in a nation of just over 
140,000 is up to more than a third of the entire population part of the army (Blandy, 
2008:14; NKR, 2013). The support from the patron state Armenia is also 
unquestionable. In many aspects NKR is becoming just another region of Armenia. 
Citizens of NKR holds Armenian passports for foreign travel, Armenians are able to 
serve their military duty in NKR and only 30 percent of NKR’s income in 2005 was 
collected inside NKR. The rest came from Armenia or the Diaspora. The year after, in 
2006, Armenia granted €60 million to NKR in interstate loans. (de Waal, 2013:289; 
Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2008:495-6) As if that was not enough support, the first president 
for NKR, Robert Kocharian, was appointed prime minister of the Republic of Armenia in 
1997, then elected president in 1998 and re-elected in 2004 (NKR, 2013). Since 2008 
have another NKR-national, Serzh Sargsyan, been Armenia’s president, something he 
                                                        
7 This is based on one of our author’s personal experience from attending the annual ’Fallen Soldiers' and 
Missing in Action Memorial Day’ on June 29, 2013 
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became after serving seven years as Armenia’s Minister of Defence (2000-2007) 
(Armenia, 2013). 
Kolstø’s forth factor also helps explaining how NKR got established. Azerbaijan was 
definitely a weak state as they emerged from the rubble of the Soviet Union. Most 
soldiers had left with the Red Army and those behind to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh were 
often freshly recruited and/or ill-discipline. That said until the fall of 1992 they fought 
Karabakh’s own irregular forces and was gaining a lot of ground inside Nagorno-
Karabakh. However a combination of the irregulars getting more organised and Armenia 
sending their army into Nagorno-Karabakh forced Azerbaijan on the defensive. Even 
more determinant was the political situation in Azerbaijan, a situation showing just how 
weak a state the country came out of the Soviet Union in. Internal quarrels between top 
military commanders and the political leadership bursted into flames in the middle of 
1993. The main commander, Suret Husseinov, got sacked, but refused to disband his 
brigade and when the government sent troops to confront Husseinov all they could do 
was to determine that the commander had somehow inherited all the weapons from a 
former Red Army airborne division. With this newly acquired weaponry in his control 
Husseinov and turned his guns around began marching towards Baku. Suddenly the 
presidency changed hands, Husseinov got appointed prime minister and the Armenians 
exploited the crisis ruthlessly, advancing and capturing many of the areas NKR now 
holds outside the region of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, thus forcing Azerbaijan to the 
negotiating table. (de Waal, 2013:222-7 & 237-8) The situation is slowly changing 
though. Azerbaijan has started an arms race financed by the oil and gas from the Caspian 
Sea. Azeri officials claim it is only to begin an arms race, forcing Armenia to bankrupt 
themselves trying to keep up, although all Armenia needs to do is keeping an armed 
force large enough to inflict enough casualties on Azerbaijan and have enough missiles 
pointed towards Azerbaijani oil installations to make war undesirable. (de Waal, 
2013:320) 
While Kolstø’s first four factors makes it easily understandable how NKR was able to 
establish and stabilise itself as independent as well as sustain status quo, the last factor 
might not be so straight forward. While no international peace keeping force have been 
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sent in to action the Minsk Group, spearheaded by Russia, the United States and France 
have been more than involved in both the ceasefire process and the following 
negotiations. Breakthroughs in the negotiations have actually been very close, but status 
quo seems to fit both Armenia and Azerbaijan very well, and in the latest round of 
negotiations in May 2011 where both President Obama and Medvedev had been pushing 
for a settlement the parties simply seemed to agree that they both were more 
comfortable with the status quo than with a settlement. (de Waal, 2013:300-22) 
Understanding how quasi-states, like NKR, are staying alive in the geo-political chess 
game once they have manage to fight themselves into existence will be particularly 
helpful later on, once we begin to address how nonrecognition is affecting NKR’s foreign.  
 
Conclusion 
We have defined NKR as a quasi-state that have de facto independence over most of 
their claimed territory, while trying to create legitimacy by building and expanding its 
state institutions. They have also, since 1994, claimed formal independence as a 
sovereign state, but not received the world’s recognition as such. Having clarified what a 
quasi-state is, it has been possible to show that NKR’s nonrecognition is not preventing 
NKR from state-building and creating statehood, though the lack of international 
recognition does make it more difficult. No protection form intervention, challenges in 
attracting foreign investments and no international organisations willing to deal with 
the NKR complicates the situation. Instead statehood promotes NKR’s legitimacy abroad 
and it is used to show the state capabilities of NKR and that since they are a de facto 
independent state, they should also be considered to be it de jure and hence recognised 
internationally. Further the statehood is the ruling elite’s control over the territory and 
the protection from NKR’s external enemy, Azerbaijan. 
Outlining the statehood of NKR as a contemporary quasi-state it is clear that the de facto 
independence from Azerbaijan and the secessionist war’s outcome that created NKR in 
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the first place is non-negotiable from NKR’s perspective. Established by a mixture of 
state failures in first the Soviet Union and later in Azerbaijan, ethnic coherency and 
international passivity, NKR will do everything in their power to keep the status quo and 
secondly hunt the international recognition they still lack. In the meantime NKR sustain 
itself on the edge of the international state system by a multitude of strategies. The 
ethnic coherency is kept strong and alive by symbolic nation-building made up of 
national holidays, museum, parades and presidential speeches remembering the war 
and reminding the population of the current situation. A huge military vis-à-vis the 
population size and protection by Armenian missiles keeps the external enemy, parent 
state Azerbaijan, at bay. Armenia, together with the large Armenian diaspora, also keeps 
NKR alive with aid, loans and investments, while the international community does not 
go beyond meditating between the parties in order to settle the conflict as well as NKR’s 
status.  
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Chapter 4: Foreign Policy Aims and Key Relations 
As part of answering how NKR is able to conduct foreign policy as an unrecognised state, 
we must first identify what NKR hopes to gain from its foreign policy. Before knowing 
their aims, how they pursue them and which relations are helpful, we cannot find an 
accurate answer to our research question. Therefore we have asked the following as a 
working question to help us along: Which factors and key relations are important for 
NKR’s foreign policy aims? 
Looking at which factors and relations that are important for NKR’s foreign policy aims 
we have used the theory of Francis Owtram, who describes that quasi-states have four 
foreign policy aims: survival, acquiring resources, demonstrating their state apparatus’ 
capabilities, and to be recognised (Owtram, 2011:136).  
 
Safety and Survival 
“Our main goal is the safety of our people, and this can only happen by getting 
independence.  I can’t see any other way.” (Gevorgian, 2013:74) Following in the wake of 
Owtram’s first aim, the representative’s quote is clear on NKR’s aim of being safe. At the 
same time Mr Gevorgian refuses that the citizens of NKR’s safety can be secured inside 
the parent state, Azerbaijan. Now, there is a difference between safety and survival, but 
the survival part is explained in the quote as well. Stressing independence as the way of 
keeping NKR’s citizens safe, survival of the quasi-state either recognised as an 
independent state, or at least upholding the de facto independence as a quasi-state, is 
necessary for the aim of safety. 
According to Owtram (2011:136) survival is determined militarily, politically and 
economically. The economical aspect also being part of the foreign policy aim of 
acquiring resources, we will concentrate on the two former topics here.   
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To survive as a quasi-state, the regime needs to have good relations with both the 
world’s great powers and with its patron state (Owtram, 2011:137). ‘Great powers’ is in 
the case of NKR: Russia, United States and France, co-chairs of the so-called Minsk Group 
(de Waal, 2013:278). This very much explains locations of the NKR Representative 
Offices around the word, the Mr Gevorgian elaborates: “France is part of the Minsk Group 
that is trying to solve the conflict between NKR and Azerbaijan. Besides France, USA and 
Russia is also member of the Minsk Group, so we have also offices there.” (Gevorgian, 
2013:74) The three co-chairs have not only been leading the negotiations between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan for the past twenty years, they have also been essential for 
providing pressure against any recurrence of the violence, so while Azerbaijan still 
refuses to meet directly with NKR (de Waal, 2013:266), the Minsk Group is an important 
factor in the quasi-state’s survival. 
The Minsk Group has been criticised for failing to solve the conflict and employ a viable 
solution, and its mediations have been questioned if at all appropriate for solving the 
conflict (Hopmann, 2013:37), although that matters less when the focus on avoiding the 
violence re-erupting keeps the status quo, i.e. NKR’s survival. This has also been very 
much the approach Russia has taken to the conflict. Azerbaijan has been able to 
massively renew and expand their military capabilities due to the oil boom from the 
Caspian Sea. To counter this development Russia has allied with Armenia and supplies 
them with weaponry in order to threat Azerbaijan with enough damage to make a 
potential attack undesirable, including renewing a lease of a Russian army base on 
Armenian soil. (de Waal, 2013:258, 272 & 290-3) Thus is the relationship between 
Armenia and the Minsk Group, especially Russia, of vital importance for NKR’s survival.  
Azerbaijan’s refusal to deal directly with NKR has the spill-over effect that none of the 
co-chairs can do so either, if they hope to keep Azerbaijan’s trust as a negotiator. This 
might seem to limit NKR’s ability to affect the negotiations in either positively or 
negatively ways. But as Owtram (2011:137) points out the quasi-state’s relationship 
with their patron state is very important. Armenia is in many regards as much of a 
patron state as can be imagined. The ruling elite in Yerevan are called the “Karabakh 
Party” and between the years 1998-2008 Armenia’s president was the former NKDA 
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commander and first president of NKR, Robert Kocharyan. For the last five years fellow 
Karabakhian and Kocharyan’s political ally, Serzh Sargsyan, has been Armenia’s 
president. Hence has NKR’s lacking access to the negotiation been less of a problem, 
though the current regime in NKR has not always agreed with the Armenian presidents. 
(de Waal, 2013: 267-73 & 290) This is a picture described very explicit by Mr Gevorgian: 
“They [The Republic of Armenia] help NKR, so the messages are passed to them, and then 
they pass the messages [on] to the international community.” (Gevorgian, 2013:76) NKR 
uses the Republic of Armenia as their official voice in much communication to the 
international community and the close relationship with its patron state Armenia is 
clearly also a key factor for the survival of NKR. 
 
Acquiring Resources and Diaspora Aid  
According to de Waal (2013:289) only thirty percent of NKR’s income in 2005 came 
from inside NKR itself. The rest was covered by the outside world. Resources in the form 
of aid and foreign investments are as we have pointed out earlier very sparse on the 
ground of quasi-states, but it still accounts for a very large part of the economy and the 
necessity of finding some kind of income to stabilise a functional self-contained economy 
is an important aim of foreign policy (Owtram, 2011:136).  
Especially two predominant relations play a crucial role for NKR’s economy. The first is 
the support from Armenia. de Waal (2013:257) describes what NKR receives from 
Armenia as ‘free credit’. And with up to seventy percent of NKR’s income being 
generated outside the area, Armenia’s part is by all accounts massive. The other major 
sponsor of NKR is the Armenian diaspora shattered around the world. Both diaspora 
organisations as well as individual Armenians have helped rebuild NKR after the war 
(Kolstrø, 2008:495). Those of NKR’s Permanent Representative Offices not in the 
countries of the Minsk Group’s co-chairs are placed in countries with a large number of 
diaspora: Germany, Australia and Lebanon. And though the diaspora-money has been 
reported decreasing multiple times has the influx of money been massive. The single 
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road linking NKR to Armenia is reportable the best road in the Caucasus, financed by ten 
million Euro collected amongst Armenians abroad. The capital of Stepanakert has been 
rebuilt from the rubbles of war by the same means. Voters of Armenian decent have 
even convinced the US Congress to give twenty million dollars in annual aid to the 
region. (de Waal, 2013:259-61, 267 & 275) 
According to Mr Gevorgian it is not the only the diaspora that supports NKR, the French 
public also support economically (Gevorgian, 2013:74), though not all the acquired 
resources are aid and friendly subsidy. The NKR authorities do acknowledge the 
important contribution of the Armenian diaspora in the NKR’s economy; but they also – 
not surprisingly – emphasize their own role in NKR’s economic policy. According to NKR 
official statements, the government is doing everything they can to stimulate NKR’s 
exports as well as attracting foreign investments (NKR USA, 2013). 
The hardships of nonrecognition are not helped by the fact that both Azerbaijan and 
Turkey are economically blockading, not only NKR, but Armenia as a whole (de Waal, 
2013:270). Having the survival aspect in mind the isolation of NKR (as unrecognised) 
and Armenia (by Azerbaijan and Turkey) is problematic. The nonrecognition makes it 
next to impossible for NKR to trade and cooperate financially or economically with the 
rest of the world and “this situation has a huge effect on the economy of NKR. “ 
(Gevorgian, 2013:76) Trade and economic benefits is an important factor to survive as a 
state (Owtram, 2011: 136). If such isolation continues, it can have serious outcomes, not 
only for NKR but also for the whole region: “If the isolation keeps going, and they 
completely cut us off from the rest of the world, there can come an aggressive outbreak in 
NKR.” (Gevorgian, 2013:76) 
Armenia’s aid and the funds pouring in from the diaspora and other foreign sources are 
vital factors for NKR and the close cooperation with the Armenian elite as well as the PR 
created by the foreign offices towards contributors are key relations in NKR’s foreign 
policy. Polling in the opposite direction is the troublesome relationship between 
Armenia and Turkey and the blockade’s spill-over effect on NKR’s already poor 
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economy. Also contributing to this is the Azerbaijani lockdown of a region, linked by 
only a single road to the outside world. 
In this sense the prevalence of the status quo represent the worst and the best option for 
NKR. During the non-fighting time, NKR had the opportunity to find investments and aid 
to rebuild its institutions and infrastructure. The investments in infrastructure are an 
important factor to NKR’s economic development. If NKR wants to be a state, and be 
seen as such by the international community, it has to develop certain economic 
capabilities to trade with the rest of the world. Trade is simply another channel to come 
nearer the international community, thereby closer to recognition.  
 
Policy for Policy’s Sake 
NKR has successfully developed its institutions in economy, military, political and social 
fields during the last twenty years as a quasi-state (Gardner, 2011:73).  NKR is also seen 
as a much stronger state than the other quasi-states, because of their institutions and 
state apparatus’ abilities (Lynch, 2001:5-7). 
One of the main aims for quasi-states is participate in foreign policy to demonstrate 
state apparatus’ capabilities. They do this in order to live up to the fourth point of Article 
1 in the ‘Convention on Rights and Duties of States’ from 1933 commonly known as the 
Montevideo Declaration8. (Owtram, 2011:136) It could be further argued that it is 
essential for quasi-states to demonstrate that, they can handle the controlled territory 
and take care of the population living within it in accordance with the values of the 
international community. In other words, the quasi-states try to show that they are an 
internationally acceptable, effective and democratic state (Caspersen, 2012:68-9). 
                                                        
8 The convention sets out the definition, rights and duties of statehood: “The state as a person of 
international law should possess the following qualifications”, of which the fourth and final qualification is 
the: “capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” (Kiel, 2010) 
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Establishing a foreign ministry, including seven representation offices in strategically 
important capitals around the world certainly support Owtram’s notion, but is 
demonstrating state capabilities part of the representative’s job description? It is 
certainly the office’s mission to cooperate with local politicians, though they mostly do 
this because they are not allowed audience with higher ranking officials as a 
nonrecognised diplomatic mission. Beside the cooperation with the local politicians, the 
aim of the NKR offices is to inform about the conflict and the conditions which the 
people of NKR live under. (Gevorgian, 2013:77) Because of the limitations on 
cooperation with the official France, the office in Paris also tries to affect public opinion. 
It can be argued that by using public affairs strategies, the NKR office tries to inform and 
engage the French society in the problems surrounding NKR and the nonrecognition: 
“The age we live in is the age of information (…) my basic aim is to pass the information 
and help people to discover NKR.” (Gevorgian, 2013:77) So while it is hard to say that 
NKR is able to perform foreign policy in the condition of nonrecognition, they certainly 
try to demonstrate their capacity to enter into relations with and within other states. 
Caspersen’s part of the theory, that state-building has everything to do with foreign 
policy, is certainly not something NKR’s officials are willing to admit voluntarily: “Our 
democracy is not for others. It’s not to impress the world. It is because we want democracy; 
it is for ourselves. (…) It is not just a beautiful idea.” (Gevorgian, 2013:78) Mr Gevorgian 
also added that without the democratic system, the gap between the people and the 
rulers would be bigger. A situation that would result in people moving away from NKR, 
leaving a weaker country behind, making survival even more challenging. Democracy is 
hence claimed to be a security measure for survival (Gevorgian, 2013:78). 
It can certainly be argued that internal legitimacy is important for a state’s survival. It 
could also be argued that willingly admitting your democracy and statehood just is a 
matter of showing capabilities as a state, would ruin the point of trying to get those same 
capabilities recognised by the international community. Smolnik notes that the NKR 
authorities do pay special attention to the democratic values as a stimulus for 
conducting elections that imitate the Western-liberal model in an effort to point out 
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their compliance with the basic conditions to be a full state in the eyes of the 
international community (2012:155-6). However, she also notes:  
In Nagorno-Karabakh’s attempt to earn recognition elections assume a central role. As they 
constitute a vital building block in Western-type democracies, elections are often used as a 
benchmark by Western policy makers to measure the level of democracy. Consequently, 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s officials frequently point to their experience in holding elections and 
stress the compliance with Western democratic standards. (Smolnik, 2012:156) 
Although Smolnik states that the elections in 2004, 2005 and 2007 ‘showed 
shortcomings’ and that NKR ranks in the absolutely lowest part of the ‘partly free’ 
category in Freedom House’s ranking, Mr Gevorgian’s expounding of the reasoning 
behind NKR’s democracy plays very well together with Smolnik’s quote above.  
Determining whether a quasi-state’s democratisation is legit can be very difficult to 
estimate; luckily this is not the task that at hand. Instead do both Smolnik and Gevorgian 
prove that foreign policy officials from NKR do use the possibilities they get to talk about 
the importance of democracy in NKR. 
Acting like a real state or showing that NKR is able to act like any other state is definitely 
an important part of the state-building aim, but there are a few other subjects that 
should be mentioned for good order. NKR having a rhetoric of statehood, Blakkisrud & 
Kolstø notice that conditions on the ground in NKR more and more looks like conditions 
in any other province of Armenia, not those of a quasi-state. For many Armenians are 
the differences more a blur than a set of facts: Armenia’s army is protecting the ceasefire 
line together with the NKDA, NKR citizens carry Armenian passports and many 
Armenian produced maps just show NKR – including the occupied territories of 
Azerbaijan – as part of Armenia. And while all, but one, of the political parties in NKR are 
still talking about independence vis-à-vis unification with Armenia, if independence is 
ever achieved, NKR ‘will be free to do what it wants with its independence’ including 
giving it up again. (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2008:502) 
The last point we should make about NKR’s aim of showing that it functions like a 
recognised state is their perspective of time. NKR is sure that time works in their favour 
and that recognised statehood essentially is built on time, not international resolutions. 
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As a former NKR prime minister asked de Waal in 2001, why are the years under Azeri 
rule more valid than the last ten years? In other words, what if NKR survive the next fifty 
years? The next hundred years? Who is then to tell NKR that they are not a real state? 
(de Waal, 2013:256) History seems to be working to the quasi-state’s advantage.  
 
The ‘Neverendum’ for Recognition 
International recognition cannot come with certain costs for NKR, their premise and 
position entering any negotiations is very clear: “The independency is necessary for us; it 
is important for our safety to be separate from Azerbaijan (…) They [Azerbaijan] want to 
destroy us. But if they recognise us, we are ready to cooperate with all of our neighbours.” 
(Gevorgian, 2013:75) Extent this line of thinking to the patron state Armenia, which is 
during the direct negotiations with Azerbaijan. Then keep in mind Azerbaijan’s position 
on their territorial integrity and NKR’s international recognition seems to be next to 
impossible.  
Owtram points out that the first three aims of conduction foreign policy: Survival, 
acquiring of resources and demonstrating the state apparatus’ capabilities, are all 
underlined by the quasi-states’ fourth foreign policy aim: An increased degree of 
recognition, either de facto or formal. De facto recognition could be anything from the 
loans provided by the US Congress, the willingness of foreign diplomats to actually work 
with NKR officials or for external companies to provide services for NKR. (Owtram, 
2011:136) This is obviously a long way from formal recognition by other states, 
international organisations and in the end the UN, but if history indeed works in the 
favour of the quasi-states, they might just be able to gather enough de facto recognition 
along the way for it to be a factor someone could recognise. 
As Gevorgian also states it is an important aim for the foreign policy missions of NKR to 
do whatever they can to get NKR recognised by the rest of the world. Trying to work 
with officials and politicians on a local or regional level is one of the strategies pursued 
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by the Permanent Representative Office in Paris, in order to reach the central French 
government (Gevorgian, 2013:74). Extent this way of working to how the Armenian 
diaspora get the US Congress to grant aid, and NKR’s foreign offices have at least two 
ways of gaining some de facto recognition: lobbying through lower level political 
channels and by influencing the diaspora – or Armenian voters – to pressure their 
governments into actions of de facto recognition. 
Forgetting the lobbying and public relational aspects of NKR’s foreign policy, Armenia 
and the Minsk Group are the key relations for NKR to gain formal recognition. Access to 
the Armenian government and their participation in the negotiations with Azerbaijan 
has been made easier by the fact that both Armenian presidents in office since 1998 
have Karabakhian roots (de Waal, 2013:274). Since 1999 Armenia and Azerbaijan have 
been close to reaching a settlement multiple, only to see it fall through in the eleventh 
hour. In 1999 the so-called Goble Plan9 brokered through confidential meetings between 
the two countries’ presidents during a NATO anniversary in Washington D.C. The plan 
fell through due to lack of support in both countries governments and parliaments. In 
April 2001 the Minsk Group facilitated the much noticed Key West summit where 
mediators claimed that 80 to 90 percent of the issues had been resolved. The Armenian 
parliament repeated NKR’s status was non-negotiable and the Azerbaijani elite firmly 
opposed the final compromise. In 2004 the Minsk Group facilitated the ‘Prague Process’ 
aiming at a referendum on NKR’s future, however the plan did not solve the final status 
of NKR, thus getting named a ‘neverendum’ that did not bring a viable solution. When an 
‘interim status’ – postponing the final status – was finally agreed upon in 2006, and the 
Minsk Group brought lawyers to write a settlement draft at the final meeting in Paris, 
the two presidents simply agreed that the status quo was more preferable than making a 
deal. (de Waal, 2013:274-88) 
The main problem for both the Armenian president, negotiation on the behalf of NKR, 
and the Azeri president is lack of public opinion supporting peace – or at least towards 
                                                        
9 Named after American diplomat Paul Goble, the NKR region (the former oblast) was to be traded to 
Armenia along with a corridor to Armenia itself, in return for Azerbaijani access across Armenian lands 
between the Azeri ‘mainland’ and the enclave of Nakhichevan. 
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settling the current situation – making it too risky for negotiating politicians to pursue a 
compromise vigorously. Something that was displayed once more in 2011 in the Russian 
city of Kazan where both parties – after very encouraging negotiations – once again 
decided on status quo as the best way forward. (de Waal, 2013:288 & 300-3) Meaning 
that one of the key relations for NKR in order to reach recognition is also one where they 
risk losing their independence. NKR’s relationship with the Armenian presidency is 
probably as tight as it can get, but the relationship between the Armenian elite and the 
public opinion is also important for finding a solution to the status quo. Does the public 
opinion change towards settlement, then the Armenian negotiators could shift away 
from the position on NKR’s status as fully independent.  
While NKR’s relation with Armenia is strong, this is not the case with the relations to 
Azerbaijan. This should not come as a surprise given the history and according to Mr 
Gevorgian direct negotiations between NKR and Azerbaijan are impossible. If Azerbaijan 
was to begin negotiations directly with NKR – even on small issues like water supply or 
moving the front lines a few miles further apart – this would mean that they ‘accepts the 
idea of NKR’. (Gevorgian, 2013:74) In other words, by entering into direct negotiations 
Azerbaijan would grant NKR de facto recognition. Instead NKR relation to Azerbaijan is 
limited to the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. 
 
Conclusion 
We have been able to identify a number of foreign policy aims for NKR, as well as a 
number of key relations the quasi-state needs to exploit in order to reach their aims. 
How well they are able to do this – if it is at all possible – we will return to in the next 
and last part of our analysis.  
All of the aims presented by Owtram have been found in NKR’s foreign policy: safety and 
survival, acquiring resources and showing state capabilities including presenting a 
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democratic state to the world’s liking. All these underlined by the aim of international 
recognition.  
The most important factor in NKR’s foreign policy is by far and large its patron state 
Armenia. Not only in terms of the income provided by the ‘free credit’ of interstate loans, 
but also through military protection, conscripts serving their time in NKR and the 
providing of passports that makes NKR nationals able to travel. The largest impact 
Armenia has on NKR is political. Being NKR’s voice in the international negotiations with 
the Minsk Group and Azerbaijan, Armenia holds the power of keeping NKR alive as a 
political entity. Arguably they also do that economically and militarily, but the constant 
negotiations keep the status quo – NKR’s survival – and works towards NKR 
independence and recognition. 
The key relation here is first and foremost the fact that large parts of the Armenian elite 
is from Nagorno-Karabakh and thus is NKR very much included in the policies and 
budgeting of Armenia. Further is the relationship between Armenia and Russia vital to 
the survival of NKR, since it is doubtful whether Armenia will be able to keep a newly 
oil-rich Azerbaijan out of NKR without the backing of Russian politics and weaponry, 
should violence resume. In continuation of this, Armenia’s relation with the Minsk Group 
and the Minsk Group’s co-chairs ability to cooperate is necessary for keeping status quo, 
which keeps NKR alive, and the negotiations that determine the final status of NKR. The 
relations between Armenia and Turkey also play an indirect role in the economy of NKR, 
since the Turkish blockade of Armenia will affect the economic assistance NKR can 
receive. 
NKR’s own relationship with the Minsk Group and the great powers is itself very limited. 
Any direct or official talks would lead to de facto recognition, sabotaging the 
negotiations between the Minsk Group and Azerbaijan. Instead NKR’s approach to the 
rest of the world is based largely on showing themselves as a democratic and functional 
state with de facto independence. The relation important for NKR between them and the 
world is especially the one to the Armenian diaspora, who helps massively with the 
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economy and acquiring resources, but also forces some de facto recognition of NKR from 
local and regional levels.  
The aim of demonstration state capabilities is directed towards the great powers and the 
world in general. Basically towards anybody who is willing to listen, as we experienced 
during our interview. Getting private funds, creating awareness of the situation and 
gaining de facto recognition from either businesses or lower level politicians are 
something that NKR cannot connect to a specific relationship. Instead it is an output, 
showing the rest of the world their elections, democratic and state-like abilities. 
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Chapter 5: Foreign Policy Possibilities 
After two chapters were we have elaborated on the understanding of NKR as a quasi-
state and analysed the aims and key relations of NKR’s foreign policy, the last part of the 
analysis will concentrate itself with by what extent NKR is able to conduct foreign policy? 
We examine how quasi-states’ foreign policy differs from foreign policy of recognised 
states, and which alternatives NKR has as a quasi-state. Owtram draws parallels from 
Christopher Hill’s point about weak states’ possibilities in the field of foreign policy: 
Hill’s assessment of the challenge of diplomacy for weak states can just as well be applied to 
most unrecognised states: ‘As a means of implementing policy, diplomacy in particular 
important to weak states. With few resources they have little choice but to play a poor hand 
as skilfully as possible.’ (Owtram, 2011:136) 
 
Foreign Policy 
Theories about foreign policy is plentiful, however much of it does not have definitions 
that is suitable when working with quasi-states. (Owtram, 2011:132) One of the few is 
Christopher Hill (2003) who provides a usable definition of foreign policy when working 
with quasi-states. According to Hill, the definition of foreign policy is: “The sum of official 
external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations.” (Hill, 2003:3) He then continues with a short discussion of what ‘an 
independent actor’ covers, explaining that the phrase opens up for other political 
entities, such as the European Union. Further, the notion of ‘official external relations’ 
does not cover ‘official’ in terms of ‘public,’ instead ‘official’ should be understood as in 
‘the official policy of the government.’ Hill argues that this is to open up for outputs from 
all parts of the state’s governing mechanism to be included, not just a president or a 
foreign minister.  He later elaborates explicitly on unrecognised states, citing Taiwan 
and Northern Cyprus as ‘prominent examples’: “Some unrecognised states effectively 
conduct independent eternal strategies, even if the lack of normal representative facilities 
and/or dependence on what is often an overbearing supports make them difficult to 
implement.” (Hill, 2003:40) It is also stated that in cases where sovereignty is denied or 
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limited, foreign policy becomes difficult, but not impossible. (Hill, 2003:3 & 31-40) All in 
all, Hill provides a useful conceptualising of what foreign policy should be understood as 
in regard to quasi-states’ possibilities in the field. 
 
Backdoor Diplomacy 
Without necessarily having read Hill, Mr Gevorgian does admit that NKR has a difficult 
time conducting foreign policy to an efficient degree, because of the nonrecognised. 
(Gevorgian, 2013:77) No country in the world, not even their patron state, Armenia, 
formally recognises the independence of NKR and this nonrecognition limits NKR’s 
opportunities to conduct foreign policy with other states or international organisations 
openly. NKR officials are banned from any of the usual diplomatic channels. This means 
that NKR is not invited to participate in the work of international organisations NKR is 
not a part of the UN system and cut off from both bi- and multilateral agreements. It is 
next to impossible to meet with foreign diplomats and should official representatives 
from NKR visit a foreign embassy, they will be received by a first secretary, not the 
ambassador (de Waal, 2013:256). An example is Mr Gevorgian (2013:78) who, as a 
French teacher, asked the French embassy in Yerevan for some textbooks, but they 
refused to help him because they are not allowed to interact with NKR, even on that very 
local level. Everything thus becomes a political stand were even the smallest gesture can 
be seen as de facto recognition.  
Instead NKR’s diplomacy is conducted in very unofficial ways, hidden from the view of 
the public and conducted in privacy to ensure the peace in the region, as it would be a 
great provocation towards Azerbaijan if any recognised state or international 
organisation negotiated with NKR publically. High-level and top-secret meetings 
between international politicians and diplomats and representatives from NKR have 
been conducted behind closed doors in Paris (Gevorgian, 2013:77). Another example of 
those meetings were at the end of the conflict in the early 90’s where the newly elected 
presidents for NKR, Robert Kocharian, and Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, held secret 
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meetings in Moscow to negotiate the ceasefire agreement. Another such example, while 
not confirmable is Samvel Babayan, the former commander in chief of Nagorno-
Karabakh Defence Army and former Defence Minister, who claims that Ilham Aliyev, 
now the president of Azerbaijan and at that time the son of the president, wanted to 
meet him in Paris to conduct secret ceasefire negotiations as well. (de Waal, 2013:256) 
So even though NKR is unrecognised some possibilities to conduct direct foreign policy 
on a high-level arise as a kind of backdoor diplomacy. But secret meetings and very off-
the-record negotiations are rarely something easily gained and this significantly limits 
NKR’s possibilities foreign policy vice. Even more unusual is the odd visit from 
international officials to NKR, but it happens just enough to be on the radar of the 
representative in Paris, though it is presented as a very, very rare possibility (Gevorgian, 
2013:76). 
The Permanent Representative Offices NKR have opened around the world are also one 
of the channels through which NKR can interact with other states. To no surprise they 
have opened their offices in states considered important for NKR, where the co-chairs of 
the Minsk Group obviously take centre stage. While access to higher-level politicians is 
still limited to secret meetings for the officials in these offices, lower level meetings with 
mayors and other local politicians are easier to arrange. (Gevorgian, 2013:74-6) The 
offices give NKR a possibility to lobby local politicians in important countries. Either as a 
long term strategy, in case some of these politicians should gain more influential 
positions, or as a way to pass information, viewpoints and opinions up through the 
political systems.  
 
Patron State Policy 
Having limited possibilities for conducting state-to-state policy, NKR must look for 
alternatives. And while it could be argued that Armenia might not be that foreign to 
NKR, we do include the policy conducted between NKR and Armenia as NKR foreign 
policy. Having already argued that NKR is a de facto independent quasi-state, policy 
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conducted between them and their patron state might not be the most negotiable for 
NKR politicians, it is however still external relations from NKR’s perspective. Owtram 
also elaborates on Hill points of limited sovereignty by pointing out that to survive in the 
international system, the unrecognised state has to have an external supporter that 
speaks on their behalf, and therefore is it a high priority to maintain the relationship 
with the patron state (Owtram, 2011:137).  
Having identified NKR’s aims and key relations in the last chapter, it was clear that 
Armenia is NKR’s the most important collaborator outside Nagorno-Karabakh, 
especially on matters of security and survival, financing NKR and in the settlement 
process towards recognition. Armenia is in the areas of survival and negotiating the 
settlement giving the quasi-state a voice in the international system, as Mr Gevorgian 
puts it: “One of the [channels for interacting with other states] is the Republic of Armenia. 
They help us. So the messages are passed to them, and then they pass the messages to the 
international community.” (Gevorgian, 2013:76) As Armenia act as NKR’s representative 
in the international community, Armenia is a major channel for conducting foreign 
policy for NKR and in essence functions as NKR’s international spokesperson. 
NKR’s use of Armenia is definitely more out of necessity than from inclination, since 
access to the international community is somewhat limited. Until the election of 
Kocharian as Armenia’s president, the lack of international representation has been a 
problem for the Karabakh Armenians. Since then, in 1998 individuals from what de Waal 
calls ‘the Karabakh Party’ inside the Armenian administration has supplied presidents 
with Karabakhian roots. (de Waal, 2013:274 & 290-1) This indicates that the NKR 
foreign political aims has a high importance for the Armenian presidency and is one of 
NKR’s most important channels for conducting foreign policy. 
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Just a Public Relations Bureau? 
The relationship with the patron state is significant and central for an unrecognised 
state as NKR. But this should not be seen as Armenia being willing to comply with all 
demands of NKR. It was pointed out to us that international propaganda against NKR or 
at least contradicting their interests does not only emerge from Azerbaijan, also 
Armenia has their geopolitical interests and there is plenty of propaganda about NKR 
appearing from Armenia as well (Gevorgian, 2013:77). Another way for NKR to conduct 
foreign policy is through public relations and public information. It seems that NKR puts 
a lot of effort in getting the public of important countries to support their quest for 
independence. 
One of the office in Paris’ tasks are public affairs; informing the French population about 
NKR and to form a common opinion about the conflict (Gevorgian, 2013:74). Gaining 
public support for its foreign policy aims is a high priority for NKR in the way they 
conduct foreign policy. The diplomatic missions do this through conferences about the 
conflict and NKR, by inviting NKR nationals and artists abroad for different cultural 
events. Trips where the people from NKR can use the occasions to explain who there are 
the problems they have and generate sympathy for the cause. (Gevorgian, 2013:77). 
Another strategy for this – let us call it public diplomacy – is to arrange or exploit visits 
from significant persons to NKR. An example is the visit of the former CNN talk show 
host Larry King in December 2013.  Mr Gevorgian points out that a visit from Larry King 
is important because he is a way to reach a lot of people. People will listen to him and it 
is therefore important for NKR to give him an impression and understanding of the 
conflict so he can inform the rest of the world about NKR. As Mr Gevorgian also points 
out there is a lot of contradicting information released from both sides of the conflict 
that is easily accessible through the internet, so it is an obvious advantage for NKR that 
they can use a “neutral voice” people feel familiar with. (Gevorgian, 2013:77) Needlessly 
to say, propaganda is a big part of any conflict, and influencing public opinion, especially 
in the countries of the Minsk Group and Armenia, can do a lot to help NKR. And in this 
day and age all kinds of information, probably very coloured from the original sources 
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can easily be accessed so NKR tries to be on top of it. One of the finest examples of such 
an information war is the newly launched www.virtualkarabakh.az10, an Azerbaijani 
homepage presenting the Azeri province of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Lastly the one big group that is important for NKR’s foreign policy aims is the diaspora. 
If NKR wants to retain the flow of money from the diaspora into the state, they need to 
keep sending them the message that money is needed. While NKR’s offices abroad 
certainly also focuses on money from other sources than the diaspora, the case from the 
United States where the diaspora convinced the Congress to give NKR a huge annual 
amount of aid clearly shows how important a supportive diaspora can be for – 
something Mr Gevorgian also admits, though he prefers to focus on all the private 
initiatives to aid NKR (Gevorgian, 2013:74). 
While it might be a little over-the-top to call NKR’s foreign policy missions for Public 
Relations Bureaus, it certainly is a big part of their job. Most notably because so many of 
the other possibilities NKR has to conduct foreign policy through are either limited or 
non-existent because of their status as a quasi-state. Lobbying and public diplomacy are 
main possibilities for NKR when conducting foreign policy on their own – that is without 
having to go through Armenia.  
 
Conclusion 
It should be very clear that the quasi-state status severely limits NKR’s possibilities to 
conduct foreign policy in the way it is typically conducted on the big international stage. 
Citing Hill, NKR has little choice but to play a poor hand as skilfully as possible. No 
membership of the UN equals; no memberships of international organisations, no access 
to international summits, no access to other states’ diplomatic officials and no help in aid 
or low practicality functions, such as supplying schools with foreign language books. 
                                                        
10 The homepage was launched on December 16, 2013 as part of a youth program decreed by President 
Aliyev. 
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NKR’s possibilities to conduct foreign policy that corresponds with their aims, instead 
falls into one of three categories: Backdoor diplomacy, patron state policy or public 
diplomacy.  
The backdoor diplomacy, or secret diplomacy, consists of off-the-record meetings or 
visits between high-level politicians, usually kept as secret as possibly not to add fuel to 
the fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In other cases, which usually involve the 
foreign offices, the backdoor diplomacy manifests itself through lobbyism where 
politicians and officials on lower levels of the political structures are sought influenced. 
Any other form of foreign policy has to go through Armenia that as the patron state 
performs a role as NKR’s voice to the international community. With this NKR do run a 
risk of letting someone else possess the responsibility for NKR’s foreign policy, and 
while Armenia is usually a very good representative for NKR it does not eliminate the 
fact that if Armenia suddenly disagrees with NKR’s position on something, NKR got no 
one else to turn to.  
The third category is public diplomacy or the public relations aspect of NKR’s foreign 
policy. Winning the information war, reminding the diaspora of the situation, creating 
awareness about NKR, definitely seems to be a focus Mr Gevorgian puts a lot of attention 
to. Whether or not it actually is the most important part of NKR’s foreign policy 
conduction is difficult to gauge. But it is the part of NKR’s foreign policy that is the least 
affected by the quasi-state status and being outside the club of accepted and ‘real’ 
foreign policy actors. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
This thesis presented a contradiction: When NKR is not recognised as a state by the 
international community, when foreign diplomats barely set foot there and will not 
include NKR’s officials in negotiations, then opening seven ‘embassies’ around the world 
for NKR to engage in foreign policy seems in vain. To examine this we decided to take a 
closer look at the possibilities and difficulties NKR has when conducting foreign policy 
and the means with which they are able to do so, defying the nonrecognition. Thus 
leading us to ask the following research question: How is the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic’s foreign policy affected by the state’s unrecognised status? 
 
Being able to answer this question the first thing needed to be investigated was the 
consequences of being unrecognised as a political entity. Hence in the first part of the 
analysis, the study looked at how to define a quasi-state and how NKR fits this definition. 
It was argued that NKR has de facto independence over most of the claimed territory 
and large parts of Azerbaijan’s territory. Within these territories had NKR been able to 
build enough institutions of statehood to claim internal legitimacy giving NKR what is 
categorised as internal sovereignty. It was also argued that state-building was a way of 
pursuing external sovereignty, e.g. recognition, though this strategy does not necessarily 
work. However the reverse effect was not proven either – on the contrary did 
nonrecognition not prevent NKR from building and expanding their institutions of 
statehood. The current status quo where NKR has survived as a quasi-state for almost 
two decades has been used to maintain the state-building process, development of the 
infrastructure, etc. The status quo has given NKR a possibility to orchestrate itself as a 
state and show the outside world that it functions as such, even though it is not 
international recognised. This has not provided the quasi-state with any formal 
recognition, but it could have had an effect on the possibilities for dialogue and foreign 
policy NKR is conducting. It certainly does show that NKR is a political entity with the 
62 
 
capabilities of any other state with de facto independence to try and conduct foreign 
policy with external partners. 
Having concluded that NKR is able to conduct foreign policy, it was necessary to identify 
their aims and most important relations. This had to be done in order to determine 
whether or not the nonrecognition have any effects on NKR’s foreign policy capabilities 
that is, if they can reach their foreign policy aims. Identifying key relations would also 
help us figure out where to look for any abnormalities or any form of cul-de-sac making 
foreign policy impossible. A number of NKR’s foreign policy aims have been described in 
the second part of this study’s analysis, while a number of key relations also have be 
found. 
The foreign policy aims are safety and survival, acquiring resources, demonstrating state 
capabilities, and the underlining aim of international recognition. The aim of safety and 
survival is first and foremost a question of keeping status quo, having the adequate 
military power for protection, the political influence not to give in to demands 
threatening NKR’s existence and being able to finance the state is activities. The last part 
of the survival aim corresponds, or overlaps, with the second aim of acquiring enough 
foreign resources through investments, aid and interstate loans. The third aim of 
showing state-like capabilities is a matter of presenting NKR as a ‘real’ state with the 
necessary institutions and organisation to control their own territory and provide 
protection for the inhabitants and the society. It also consists of showing the 
international community that the necessary level of democracy is present in NKR, which 
is why officials have a special focus on the elections held within NKR.  The last and 
overall underlying aim of NKR is the international recognition, and it can be argued that 
all of the above aims provide evidence – at least according to NKR – that their quasi-
state is in fact a de facto state that deserves full international recognition.  
A number of key relations are important for NKR to achieve, or at least pursue, these 
aims. Most important is the patron state Armenia, which not only provides military 
protection, both directly and through its alliance with Russia, but is also granting NKR 
‘free credit’ inter-state loans. Politically Armenia is also the most important foreign 
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relation NKR has, acting as their voice in the international community and in the 
negotiations for a final settlement. Armenia is thus keeping NKR alive by upholding the 
status quo. This relationship is further strengthened by the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Party’ in 
the Armenian elite that includes the current presidency. Secondly the Armenian 
diaspora abroad is providing much needed funds to NKR – both by their own aid and 
investments, but also by putting pressure of foreign donors like the US Congress.  
The relation to the Minsk Group’s co-chairs and other great power’s diplomats is 
another important key relation for NKR’s foreign policy. The quasi-state status and 
nonrecognition have some implications for conducting foreign policy that is 
troublesome for NKR. Any direct talks would be seen by Azerbaijan as de facto 
recognition and is therefore impossible, but NKR are still able to promote itself through 
their statehood capabilities. Demonstration to the eyes of the world – and whoever else 
is willing to listen – their institutions, elections and any other state-like ability they think 
will be well received.  
With aims and key relations for NKR’s foreign policy we are able to examine how the 
possibilities of using those key relations to reach NKR’s aims are affected by the quasi-
state status as unrecognised. And by many of the usual diplomatic methods – 
participation in international summits and organisations, bilateral agreements, the UN, 
etc. – the lack of formal recognition does make it impossible for NKR to conduct foreign 
policy. This makes us able to put forward the following hypothesis: As a quasi-state NKR 
must, instead of conducting foreign policy through high-level diplomacy, apply three 
more alternative methods of foreign policy, namely: Backdoor diplomacy, patron state 
policy and public diplomacy to pursue their aims. Here the first category consists of 
secrecy and off-the-record meetings with high-level foreign politicians and lobbying 
through the lower political and domestic levels inside the states’, the quasi-state wants 
to influence. The second category covers a strategy of talking through a patron state, 
letting the quasi-state’s own foreign policy flow through the patron state’s foreign 
policy. The last – and possibly the most important for the quasi-states’ missions around 
the world – is providing information and propaganda to key recipients, promote and 
create awareness about the quasi-state’s situation and demonstrate the quasi-state’s 
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democratic and state-like capabilities. Whether the receivers are the diaspora, foreign 
governments and politicians or a general public which opinion is sought swayed.  
 
Reflective Discussion 
Throughout of this study, the focus has been on the quasi-state’s foreign policy and how 
the unrecognised status has an effect on NKR’s conduction of foreign policy.  However 
there are aspects to how NKR is able to conduct their foreign policy that this study, for 
different reasons, has not included, which could otherwise have added to the strength of 
the conclusion. If such aspects were part of our study, the outcome of could have been 
different. 
The domestic policy of NKR is absent from our analysis, simply because the polity of 
NKR is too far away from us, both geographically and academically in terms of available 
data we have been through. The different aspects of the domestic power struggles – like 
the one jailing the former defence minister in 1994 (de Waal, 2013:252) – would have 
taken some very specific questions asked in to some very specific people in order to get 
some reliable data. But it cannot be denied that the relations between interests, political 
or military, within NKR can affect how the quasi-state conducts its foreign policy.  
Beside the domestic politics, the position of Armenia is also critical. The study does not 
take the patron state’s interest and their relation with NKR significantly into account. It 
can be argued that Armenia has their separate interests, for example: Armenia is to an 
extent also economically isolated from the international market.  The closed borders to 
Azerbaijan and Turkey have a serious effect on the economic development in Armenia 
(de Waal, 2013:218). New developments between Turkey and Armenia are thought-
provoking: Recently Turkey offered to open certain border posts if Armenia agreed to 
return two of the NKR occupied districts back to Azerbaijan. (Ternt, 2013) If Armenia 
should agree with Turkey to cooperate politically or economically, the position of 
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Armenia in the conflict could change, which in turn could have an effect on NKR’s foreign 
policy.  
It can be suggested that the power balance in the region has an effect on the key 
relations of NKR’s foreign policy. Possible Russian and Iranian interests are absent from 
this research. Russia is major player in the region and has their specific interests in 
South Caucasus, e.g. Azerbaijan’s Caspian oil and gas resources (de Waal, 2013:263). 
This could affect Russia’s position having huge effects on Armenia’s and NKR’s foreign 
policies. This study could have strengthened its conclusion by approaching NKR’s 
foreign policy from the Minsk Group’s co-chair’s position, thus gaining further inside to 
the workings of the backdoor diplomacy.  
All in all, there are perspectives and aspects to NKR’s foreign policy that could have 
benefitted our conclusion, but simply was not possible to take into account. Having these 
limits in mind and remembering to perceive the conclusion from NKR’s perspective, 
knowledge has certainly been gained through our research that has prepared for future 
studies into these other perspectives.   
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Appendixes: 
Interview Guide 
We start out easy to set up a good atmosphere. Furthermore, we want to ask open questions, which 
gives the interviewee the possibility to give us information we haven’t thought of - no question 
formulations that will result in yes/no answers.  
We want to hear how the Nagorno-Karabakh diplomat views the practising of foreign policy. How 
they are reaching their goals and how successful they are. Does he see any problems in every-day 
diplomacy and are some of the obstacles imposed because of the international community’s 
nonrecognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). 
At the end of the interview we plan to invite the diplomat on a cup of coffee - either right after the 
interview or during the evening - to be able to have a more relaxed conversation with him. 
 
 
Reading the guide: The first column (Aim) identifies the group of questions and what 
they aim to do and/or explore. The second column (Question) is the specific question we 
want to ask and the third column (Wanted output) is what we would like to know by 
asking the specific question. The third column also works as a guide telling us when we 
need to ask follow up questions to get the information we need. 
 
Aim Question Wanted Output 
Intro questions 
Aim: To get the 
interview going 
How did you end up at this mission 
and what are you primary job 
functions as an official 
representative? 
 
 
Why did you set up an office in 
France and what is your mission’s 
goal here? 
 
 
 
Insight about the 
representation’s purpose. 
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NKR’s diplomacy and 
foreign policy 
Aim: Examine NKR’s 
foreign policy’s aims 
and goals  
 
 
What are the main purpose and 
goals in NKR’s foreign policy? 
The reasons for NKR to do 
foreign policy in the first 
place. 
Beside international recognition, 
what are the main diplomatic aims 
for NKR? 
 
(Economic security, unofficial 
recognition, lobbying with the 
Armenian community in France, 
etc.) 
Bonus question in case 
the answer above focuses 
singlehandedly on 
recognition. 
 How did NKR’s MFA decide on the 
eight countries you have 
representation offices in? 
NKR’s reasoning behind 
setting up international 
offices 
Nonrecognition and 
foreign policy 
Aim: Figure out how 
nonrecognition is 
affecting NKR’s FP 
Which implications does the lack of 
official recognition from the 
international community have on 
NKR opportunities to conduct 
foreign policy? 
Identifying any difficulties 
in NKR’s diplomacy. 
Without the access to join 
international organisations, which 
platforms do NKR have for 
interacting with other states? 
The places NKR can 
actually make foreign 
policy. 
How does the foreign policy of NKR 
differ from a state that is fully 
recognised and an UN member? 
 
 
 
 
To show the differences 
between recognition and 
nonrecognition. 
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The practicalities of 
NKR’s foreign policy 
Aim: Clarify the exact 
opportunities of the 
representation office  
 
 
 
 
Through which channels (how?) 
are you – as a diplomat – able to 
communicate with other states? 
Does NKR have access to 
conferences, bilateral 
meetings, official 
negotiations, etc. 
How does NKR practice its foreign 
policy on a day-to-day basis? 
Identifying NKR’s 
diplomatic procedures.  
How are you conducting your job 
as a representative here in France? 
Personal experiences to 
show how NKR conducts 
foreign policy on a 
practical level. 
 What – if any – are the obstacles for 
you as a NKR diplomat working 
with foreign representatives? 
Being from a 
nonrecognised state what 
difficulties do they face? 
 
 
Interview Transcript 
M: Morten 
E: Emrah 
G: Mr Gevorgian 
 
M: Introduction of ourselves. 
G: Karabakh Republic was proclaimed in 1991, unfortunately still troubled with 
Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan still does not take part in the negotiations. In these conditions 
NKR authorities cannot express themselves and they are not included to the 
negotiations because they are not allowed.  
To summarize, we have two basic principles, which determines our policy. One is 
protecting the safety of the people living there, no matter what; the other is to do 
whatever needed to get recognised in a peaceful way, without being aggressive.   
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M: So the main goal is protections and to be recognised. Why did you set up an office 
here in France, and what is your mission’s goal here? 
G: France is part of the Minsk Group that is trying to solve the conflict between NKR and 
Azerbaijan. Beside France, USA and Russia is also member of the Minsk Group, so we 
have also offices there. We have 3 main objectives/goals. The first is to work with 
French politicians. But because we are not recognised it is hard to have a relationship 
with the government in France, therefore we try to cooperate with the local and regional 
politicians and thereby reach the French government by using those channels. The 
second goal is the media. By using the media, we try to inform the French people about 
the NKR and the conflict itself and we try to explain the French populations about the 
NKR’s desire for protection. The third is to cooperate with the Armenians in French.  
M: You talked about the Armenian population in France. You have also a large 
population in USA and Germany, where you also have office. Do you also use the offices 
to collect money from the Armenian populations for your goals for NKR?   
G: Of course, we get some financial support from the Armenian diaspora. But we also get 
support from non-Armenian. French people are very supportive on the NKR case, and 
support us both financial and with their knowledge and experiences, to reach our goals, 
and support us in the negotiations.  But the support is not only going through our offices. 
Of course we are not the only representative. The Armenian born French and Americans 
have their own humanitarian foundations and help NKR to development and built up the 
state.  
M: Beside of that, you talked about the most important thing for you are to protect the 
Armenian population in NKR and get recognition, beside of this; does NKR have other 
political aims?  
G: Our main goals, is based on the two principles we have: To protect NKR and get the 
international recognition. We want to maintain a peaceful negotiation with Azerbaijan, 
and we want to keep the peace between NKR and Azerbaijan, and we do not have any 
interest to go in war with Azerbaijan. But again, we will protect our people no matter 
what. The peace is important to us, as well as the safety of our people. If the safety of our 
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people is threatened, we will answer to that. We are not only peaceful or pacifist; we will 
fight for the safety of the NKR population.  
E: if Azerbaijanis says: Well, we will protect the Armenian population in NKR; would it 
be fine with NKR to be a part of Azerbaijan?  
G: No. Our main goal is the safety of our people, and this can only happen by getting 
independence.  I can’t see any other way. I can give you three examples. (1.) In 1988 and 
1990, twenty years ago, Armenians in Azerbaijani areas got massacred only because 
there was Armenians. (2.) An Azeri officer killed an Armenian officer. This Azeri officer 
was arrested two years ago in Budapest. The Republic of Azerbaijan wanted to punish 
this officer in Azerbaijan, but when he landed in the Airport, he was released and he 
could go freely, and the Azeri people saw him as a hero, and the president of Azerbaijan 
saw him as role model for the Azeri youth. (3.) About a year ago, a man from Azerbaijan 
wrote a fiction novel, where Armenians was written in a positive light. His books were 
public burned. The man had to flee to Turkey, because of this novel. All those examples 
give us no reason to trust Azerbaijan, even though there tell us that there are going to 
protect us. Therefore the independency is necessary for us; it is important for our safety 
to be separate from Azerbaijan.   
M: On the long run, do you see cooperation with Azerbaijan, in the area of economic, 
cultural and so on? 
G: Azerbaijan is our neighbour. Of course, if they recognise our independency, we are 
ready to make cooperation with them. We cannot destroy Azerbaijan and do not want to 
do it, but they want to destroy us. But if they recognise us, we are ready to cooperate 
with all of our neighbours.  An example where we try to cooperate with Azerbaijan was 
when we had to find a solution to the water problem in NKR. Between NKR and 
Azerbaijan there is some water “stockpile”. We want to cooperate with them, to share 
the water between us, but they refused it. Because, if they negotiated with us, this would 
mean that Azerbaijan had recognised us, as an actor, and this would not be accepted by 
the Azeri population. Another example is that we try to move the front line between 
NKR and Azerbaijan, because the soldiers there shoot on each other from time to time. 
We suggested that both parts could move their front line a few miles back, so the soldier 
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didn’t shoot each other. But Azerbaijan refused it again. If they cooperate with us, it 
would mean that they accept the idea of NKR. Therefore Azerbaijan refuses all kind of 
cooperation, even if it is peacefully.  
M: Another question is which implications does the lack of official recognition from 
international community have on the NKR opportunities to conduct foreign policy? 
G: The situation is that NKR cannot publicly cooperate. If we take France as an example: 
France cannot cooperate with us, because we are not recognised internationally. This 
means that, French companies cannot do business with us, and NKR cannot do business 
with France. The same situation is for the rest of the world. This situation has a huge 
effect on the economy of NKR. Beyond that, Azerbaijan has a politic to isolate NKR from 
any communication with the rest of the world. For example the Palestine, even though 
they are not recognised they’re still dealing with the rest of the world, and have relations 
with the other states and there is an international interacting. But in our case we get 
more and more isolated because of Azerbaijan. If the isolation keeps going on, and they 
completely cut us off from the rest of the world, there can be an aggressive outbreak in 
NKR. This could be another implication for the missing recognition. Because, no one is 
dealing with NKR, and Azerbaijan does not allow any cooperation or letting no one in; 
thereby they isolate and limit us.  
M: Now you have talked about the implications. Without the access to join international 
organisations, which platforms does NKR have for interacting with other states? 
G: there are three channels. One of them is the Republic of Armenia; they help NKR. So 
the messages are passed to them, and then they pass the messages to the international 
community. Otherwise there are offices like this one, in major countries, where we try to 
do our foreign policy. And there are also represents from states like France, that come to 
NKR to investigate and find out what needs to be said in the international community. 
NKR cannot do it directly. The visits from other countries are something that happens 
few times; it is not all the time. So we are still limited when it comes to our voice in the 
international community.  
M: Being unrecognised by France, do you have any obstacles or problems when you are 
interacting with the French state? 
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G: On a higher level, the door is closed. If we want to meet higher-level politicians, it has 
to be behind closed door and kept secret. But on the lower level, like the Mayor or a local 
politician, it is easier to meet with them. But the more higher you go, the more secret 
becomes the meetings. They cannot openly hold the meetings, because they want to 
keep the peace in the region. As a result, because of the isolation and the problems 
meeting higher-level politicians, the solving of the conflict is hidden away in the corner.  
M: how does NKR practice its foreign policy on a day-to-day basis?   
G: When I come to the office, the first thing I do, is to answer all the students, journalists 
or others who are interested in NKR and have some questions about NKR. Our first step 
is to get the information out. And then we also hold conferences for students, journalists 
and whom it interest, to get more information about NKR. Sometimes we have also 
people to come from NKR to Paris, to explain their problems, and their culture, and their 
people, and explain who they are. Sometimes it can be an art or painting display. 
Sometimes, it is also officials that come to inform the people here about the situation in 
NKR. So it its two side flow of information. My basic aim is to pass the information and 
help people to discover NKR. My job is to open the information channels that is tried to 
be stopped. My job is to inform the people so they can support our case.  
M: I can understand from your, that the public relations and public affairs are a big part 
of your job. How much does it mean that person like Larry King is going to visit NKR?  
G: It is amazing that he is visiting us. Because, due to the isolation and sometimes the 
financial situation, if a person like Larry King, a voice of many people, would see with his 
own eyes the situation and he will understand, because he will fell the conflict, and 
thereby he can inform the rest of the world about what is going on in NKR. The age we 
live in is the age of information. You can access a lot of information online, but the 
problem is that most of it is propaganda. Propaganda from Azerbaijan and even from 
Armenia. You have a false impression when you read about the conflict online, because 
of the propaganda from both side. Another person, who comes to NKR, can be a natural 
voice, and when he passes the information out to the world, it would be more trustful.    
M: How does the foreign policy of NKR differ from a state that is fully recognised and a 
member of the UN? Are there any differences?   
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G: What we only can do right now, is to inform the people. And the next would be to 
cooperate with the people. There was a time where I was a French teacher in NKR. We 
needed some French books, and I asked the French embassy in Armenia. But they 
refused to support us with some books, because there are not allowed to interact with 
us. We are limited with something as getting access to textbooks. Everything becomes 
political stands. Even though people in NKR want to visit other countries, their visa is 
denied, because NKR is not recognised. When we get recognised, we would have the 
opportunity to cooperate with other states.  
M: Do you have other cooperation with the other unrecognised states in South 
Caucasus?  
G: There is not really cooperation. There are just small talks between them. Not really 
cooperation.  
M: But all the South Caucasus unrecognised states have the same aim, to be recognised. 
Does it not sense to cooperate in the field of foreign policy?  
G: Each unrecognised state has its own story, conflict and relation with the rest of the 
world. They cannot really help each other. There are states that have been recognised in 
some part of the world, and there are others that haven’t, because some states mean that 
it is against the international law. 
E: Is it possible that NKR does not cooperate with the other unrecognised states in South 
Caucasus because NKR see itself as more democratic, and thereby tries to come closer to 
the west?  
G:  Our democracy is not for others. It’s not to impress the world. It is because we want 
democracy; it is for ourselves. Without the democratic system the gap between the 
people and those that rule would be bigger, thereby would people leave NKR, and 
thereby weakening the country. Democracy is our security, it is not just a beautiful ideas. 
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